TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 11, 1942

TO: LONDON

No. 104 MAND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER 27 REGARDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF AIR
MARSHAL PRIRSE AS COMMANDER OF COMBINED ABDA AIR FORCE:
IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE EFFECT ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC
OF ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY THAT NAVAL COMMAND IS PASSING FROM UNITED
STATES TO DUTCH I WOULD PREFER TO DELAY PUBLICITY REGARDING
PRIRSE FOR THE TIME BRING. IF SUCH DELAY IS AN EMBARRASSMENT
TO YOU THEN WILL YOU GO AHRAD AND AUTHORIZE WAVELL TO MAKE THE
ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS.

WHILE WE ARE SORRY TO HAVE HARRIS GO WE WILL WELCOME AVILL
AND I WILL MAKE IT MY BUSINESS TO SEE HIM SOON.

	DECLASSIFIED
Ву	Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By.	Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Da	0.4074

Sent Vie France Commiscations OPNAV. NO. 112237 9 FAB 1742



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

February 11, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reference to drafts of a cable from you to the Prime Minister and from the Department to Mr. Winant on the British proposals regarding the interim Lease-Lend agreement, Dean Acheson has had a discussion with Harry Hopkins, following your talk with Harry. Together they have redrafted the message from you to the Prime Minister to act as a substitute for all the papers which I sent to you yesterday. It seems to me an improvement and I think that it is well worth sending as a final effort to reach an agreement upon the present draft of the interim agreement. I am submitting it to you for your consideration. If you approve the message, do you wish to send it by naval radio or through the Department? The latter course would enable the Ambassador to be informed of our latest step.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House

1 Jells

Enclosure.

February 11, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reference to drafts of a cable from you to the Prime Minister and from the Department to Mr. Winant on the British proposals regarding the interim Lease-Lend agreement, Dean Acheson has had a discussion with Harry Hopkins, following your talk with Harry. Together they have redrafted the message from you to the Prime Minister to act as a substitute for all the papers which I sent to you yesterday. It seems to me an improvement and I think that it is well worth sending as a final effort to reach an agreement upon the present draft of the interim agreement. I am submitting it to you for your consideration. If you approve the message, do you wish to send it by naval radio or through the Department? The latter course would enable the Ambassador to be informed of our latest step.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAFROM
THE PRESIDENT.

No.105 In regard to the proposed exchange of notes relating to Article 7 of the interim Lend-Lease Agreement,
referred to in your message No. 25, I want to make it
perfectly clear to you that it is the furthest thing
from my mind that we are attempting in any way to ask
you to trade the principle of imperial preference as a
consideration for Lend-Lease.

Furthermore, I understand something of the nice relationships your constitution requires of your home government in dealing with the Dominions. Obviously the Dominions must not only be consulted but I assume you must have their approval on any affirmative changes

Communitarios.
OPNIN M. 112235 of Feb 1942

in existing arrangements which might be developed in the broad discussions which you and I both contemplate.

It seems to me the proposed note leaves a clear implication that Empire preference and, say, agreements between ourselves and the Philippines are excluded before we sit down at the table.

All I am urging is an understanding with you that we are going to have a bold, forthright, and comprehensive discussion looking forward to the construction of what you so aptly call "a free, fertile economic policy for the post-war world". It seems perfectly clear to me that nothing should now be excluded from those discussions. None of us knows how those discussions will turn out, although, as I told you when you were here last, I have great confidence that we can organize a different kind of world where men shall really be free economically as well as politically.

The idea of attaching notes to this interim agreement would seem to me to give an impression to our enemies that we were overly cautious. I believe the peoples not only of our two countries but the peoples of all the world will be heartened to know that we are going to try together and with them for the organization of a democratic post-war world and I gladly accept your intimation that we might get going at once with our economic discussions.

What seems to be bothering the Cabinet is the thought that we want a commitment in advance that Empire preference will be abolished. We are asking for no such commitment, and I can say that Article 7 does not contain any such commitment. I realize that that would be a commitment which your government could not give now if it wanted to; and I am very sure that I could not, on my part, make any commitment relative to a vital revision of our tariff policy. I am equally sure that both of us are going to face in this realistic world adjustments looking forward to your "free and fertile economic policy for the post-war world", and that things which neither of us now dreams of will be subjects of the most serious consideration in the not too distant future. So nothing should be excluded from

the discussions.

Can we not, therefore, avoid the exchange of notes which, as I have said, seems to dilute our statement of purpose with cautious reservations, and sign the agreement on the assurances which I give in reference to the matter that seems to be the stumbling block.

I feel very strongly that this would demonstrate to the world the unity of the American and British people.

In regard to coming to a meeting of minds with you at an early date, I only need to say to you that there are very important considerations here which make an early understanding desirable.

In saying this, I want again to tell you that I am not unmindful of your problem. We have tried to approach the whole matter of Lend-Lease in a manner that will not lead us into the terrible pitfalls of the last war.

EF OF NAVAL OPER

FROM: THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

TO: U. S. NAVAL ATTACHE LONDON

112235 NCR 1328

12 FEBRUARY 1942

TEXT: THE FOLLOWING IS SOME AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON AND WINANT FROM THE PRESIDENT

NO. 105. IN REGARD TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES RELATING TO ARTICLE 7 OF THE INTERIM LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT, REFERRED TO IN YOUR MESSAGE NO. 25, I WANT TO MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO YOU THAT IT IS THE FURTHEST THING FROM MY MIND THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING IN ANY WAY TO ASK YOU TO TRADE THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPERIAL PREFERENCE AS A CONSIDERATION FOR LEND-LEASE.

FURTHERMORE, I UNDERSTAND SOMETHING OF THE NICE RELATIONSHIPS YOUR CONSTITUTION REQUIRES OF YOUR HOME GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE DOMINIONS. OBVIOUSLY THE DOMINIONS MUST NOT ONLY BE CONSULTED BUT I ASSUME YOU MUST HAVE THEIR APPROVAL ON ANY AFFIRMATIVE CHANGES IN EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED IN THE BROAD DISCUSSIONS WHICH YOU AND I BOTH CONTEMPLATE.

IT SEEMS TO ME THE PROPOSED NOTE LEAVES A CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT EMPIRE PREFERENCE AND, SAY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE PHILIPPINES ARE EXCLUDED BEFORE WE SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE.

ALL I AM URGING IS AN UNDERSTANDING WITH YOU THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A BOLD, FORTHRIGHT, AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION LOOKING FOR-WARD TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT YOU SO APTLY CALL "A FREE, FERTILE ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE POST-WAR WORLD". IT SEEMS PERFECTLY CLEAR TO ME THAT NOTHING SHOULD NOW BE EXCLUDED FROM THOSE DISCUSSIONS. NONE OF US KNOWS HOW THOSE DISCUSSIONS WILL TURN OUT, ALTHOUGH, AS I TOLD YOU WHEN YOU WERE HERE LAST, I HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN ORGANIZE A DIFFERENT KIND OF WORLD WHERE MEN SHALL REALLY BE FREE ECONOMICALLY AS WELL AS POLITICALLY.

THE IDEA OF ATTACHING NOTES TO THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD SEEM TO ME TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION TO OUR ENEMIES THAT WE WERE OVERLY CAUTIOUS.

I BELIEVE THE PEOPLES NOT ONLY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES BUT THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE WORLD WILL BE HEARTENED TO KNOW THAT WE ARE GOING TO TRY TOGETHER AND WITH THEM FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A DEMOCRATIC POST-WAR WORLD AND I GLADLY ACCEPT YOUR INTIMATION THAT WE MIGHT GET GOING AT ONCE WITH OUR ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS.

WHAT SEEMS TO BE BOTHERING THE CABINET IS THE THOUGHT THAT WE WANT A COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE THAT EMPIRE PREFERENCE WILL BE ABOLISHED. WE ARE ASKING FOR NO SUCH COMMITMENT, AND I CAN SAY THAT ARTICLE 7 DOES NOT

CONTAIN ANY SUCH COMMITMENT. I REALIZE THAT THAT WOULD BE A COMMITMENT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD NOT GIVE NOW IF IT WANTED TO; AND I AM VERY SURE THAT I COULD NOT, ON MY PART, MAKE ANY COMMITMENT RELATIVE TO A VITAL REVISION OF OUR TARIFF POLICY. I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT BOTH OF US ARE GOING TO FACE IN THIS REALISTIC WORLD ADJUSTMENTS LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR "FREE AND FERTILE ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE POST-WAR WORLD", AND THAT THINGS WHICH NEITHER OF US NOW DREAMS OF WILL BE SUBJECTS OF THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. SO NOTHING SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE DISCUSSIONS.

CAN WE NOT, THEREFORE, AVOID THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES WHICH, AS I HAVE SAID, SEEMS TO DILUTE OUR STATEMENT OF PURPOSE WITH CAUTIOUS RESERVATIONS, AND SIGN THE AGREEMENT ON THE ASSURANCES WHICH I HERE GIVE IN REFERENCE TO THE MATTER THAT SEEMS TO BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK.

I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THE UNITY OF THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH PEOPLE.

IN REGARD TO COMING TO A MEETING OF MINDS WITH YOU AT AN EARLY DATE, I ONLY NEED TO SAY TO YOU THAT THERE ARE VERY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS HERE WHICH MAKE AN EARLY UNDERSTANDING DESIRABLE.

IN SAYING THIS, I WANT AGAIN TO TELL YOU THAT I AM NOT UNMINDFUL OF YOUR PROBLEM. WE HAVE TRIED TO APPROACH THE WHOLE MATTER OF LEND-LEASE IN A MANNER THAT WILL NOT LEAD US INTO THE TERRIBLE PITFALLS OF THE LAST WAR.

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Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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OPNAV 112235 NCR 1328 CONTINUED PAGE 3.

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IN SAYING THIS, I WANT AGAIN TO TELL YOU THAT I AM NOT UNMINDFUL OF YOUR PROBLEM. WE HAVE TRIED TO APPROACH THE WHOLE MATTER OF LEND-LEASE IN A MANNER THAT WILL NOT LEAD US INTO THE TERRIBLE PITFALLS OF THE LAST WAR.

ROOSEVELT.

PRESIDENT UNITED STATESORIG.
SEALED SECRET FILE.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

SEALED



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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

February 13, 1942

Dorothy:

This can be filed. It was left on the President's desk by Mr. Hopkins.

Lois

THE WHITE HOUSE

February 16, 1942

DOROTHY:

This can be filed. The green

papers represent the draft of a cable

which was not sent. I have no copy of

the cable that finally was sent. It

went from the State Department and you

probably already have a copy of it.

LOIS

pot/

TELEGRAM

NO. 106

FEBRUARY 18, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

AND PERSONAL

I REALIZE HOW THE FALL OF SINGAPORE HAS AFFECTED YOU AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT GIVES THE WELL-KNOWN BACK SEAT DRIVERS A FIELD DAY BUT NO MATTER HOW SERIOUS OUR SETBACKS HAVE BEEN, AND I DO NOT FOR A MOMENT UNDERRATE THEM, WE MUST CONSTANTLY LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEXT MOVES THAT NEED TO BE MADE TO HIT THE EMERY.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE OF GOOD HEART IN THESE TRYING WEEKS
BECAUSE I AM VERY SURE THAT YOU HAVE THE GREAT CONFIDENCE OF THE MASSES
OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I THINK OF YOU OFTEN AND
I KNOW YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ASK HE IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU THINK
I CAN DO.

WHEN I SPEAK ON THE RADIO NEXT MONDAY EVENING I SHALL SAY
A WORD ABOUT THOSE PEOPLE WHO TREAT THE EPISODE IN THE CHANNEL AS A DEFEAT.
I AM MORE AND MORE CONVINCED THAT THE LOCATION OF ALL THE GERMAN SHIPS IN
GERMANY MAKES OUR JOINT MORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL PROBLEM MORE SIMPLE.

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS TO THE FAR EAST. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST AT ALL COSTS MAINTAIN OUR TWO FLANKS - THE RIGHT BASED ON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AND THE LEFT IN BURMA, INDIA AND CHINA.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ABLE BECAUSE OF OUR GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION TO REINFORCE THE RIGHT FLANK MUCH BETTER THAN YOU CAN AND I THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT INMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT AND MAINTENANCE, USING AUSTRALIA AS THE DECLASSIFIED the U.S. By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. Ctewart

WHILE THE DEFENSE OF JAVA LOOKS DIFFICULT, I BELIEVE WE BOTH SHOULD FIGHT HARD FOR IT BUT WE MUST PLAN FOR THE MORE SOUTHERLY PERMANENT BASE TO STRIKE BACK FROM. THIS WILL INCLUDE SOME OF THE ISLANDS FURTHER NORTH, SUCH AS NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI.

BRITAIN IS BETTER PREPARED TO REINFORCE BURMA AND INDIA AND I
VISUALIZE THAT YOU WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT THEATER. WE WOULD
SUPPLEMENT YOU IN ANY WAY WE COULD, JUST AS YOU WOULD SUPPLEMENT OUR EFFORTS
ON THE RIGHT FLANK.

THE UNITED STATES CHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE OUR SUPPLIES, PRINCIPALLY AIRCRAFT, THROUGH INTO CHINA BECAUSE I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE AN EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATION FROM THERE. LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS.

BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE LOSS OF MOST OF THE ABDA AREA
ACTIVE OPERATIONS WILL MOVE FAIRLY RAPIDLY INTO THE BURMA AREA ON THE WEST
AND THE ANZAC AREA ON THE EAST. THIS WOULD CAUSE RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE
ABDA COMMANDS AND THE SHIFTING OF PERSONNEL.

I HAVE NOT HEARD HOW CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS GETTING ON BUT I AM UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS VISIT WILL BE USEPUL.

DO LET ME HEAR FROM YOU.

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Date_	_OCT	6 107	-	-

TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 18, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

No. 106 I REALIZE HOW THE FALL OF SINGAPORE HAS AFFECTED YOU AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT GIVES THE WELL-KNOWN BACK SEAT DRIVERS A FIELD DAY BUT NO MATTER HOW SERIOUS OUR SETBACKS HAVE BEEN, AND I DO NOT FOR A MOMENT UNDERRATE THEM, WE MUST CONSTANTLY LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEXT MOVES THAT WEED TO BE MADE TO HIT THE ENEMY.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE OF GOOD HEART IN THESE TRYING WEEKS
BECAUSE I AM VERY SURE THAT YOU HAVE THE GREAT CONFIDENCE OF THE MASSES
OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I THINK OF YOU OFTEN AND
I KNOW YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ASK ME IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU THINK
I CAN DO.

WHEN I SPEAK ON THE RADIO NEXT MONDAY EVENING I SHALL SAY
A WORD ABOUT THOSE PEOPLE WHO TREAT THE EPISODE IN THE CHANNEL AS A DEFEAT.
I AM WORE AND MORE CONVINCED THAT THE LOCATION OF ALL THE GERMAN SHIPS IN
GERMANY MAKES OUR JOINT NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL PROBLEM MORE SIMPLE.

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT DURING THE LAST FEN DAYS TO THE FAR EAST. IT SEERS TO ME THAT WE BUST AT ALL COSTS MAINTAIN OUR TWO FLANKS - THE RIGHT BASED ON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AND THE LEFT IN BURNA, INDIA AND CHINA.

GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION TO REINFORCE THE RIGHT FLANK MUCH BETTER THAN YOU CAN AND I THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT INVEDIATE REINFORCEMENT AND MAINTENANCE, USING AUSTRALIA AS THE DECLASSIFIED MAIN BASE. By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date OCT 6 1971

WHILE THE DEPENSE OF JAVA LOOKS DIFFICULT, I BELIEVE WE BOTH
SHOULD FIGHT HARD FOR IT BUT WE MUST PLAN FOR THE MORE SOUTHERLY PERMANENT
BASE TO STRIKE BACK FROM. THIS WILL INCLUDE SOME OF THE ISLANDS FURTHER
MORTH, SUCH AS NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI.

BRITAIN IS BETTER PREPARED TO REINFORCE BURMA AND INDIA AND I
VISUALIZE THAT YOU WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT THEATER. WE WOULD
SUPPLEMENT YOU IN ANY WAY WE COULD, JUST AS YOU WOULD SUPPLEMENT OUR EFFORTS
ON THE RIGHT FLANK.

THE UNITED STATES CHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE OUR SUPPLIES, PRINCIPALLY AIRCRAFT, THROUGH INTO CHINA BECAUSE I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE AN EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATION FROM THERE. LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS.

BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE LOSS OF MOST OF THE ABDA AREA
ACTIVE OPERATIONS WILL MOVE FAIRLY RAPIDLY INTO THE BURMA AREA ON THE WEST
AND THE ANZAC AREA ON THE EAST. THIS WOULD CAUSE RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE
ABDA COMMANDS AND THE SHIFTING OF PERSONNEL.

I HAVE NOT HEARD BON CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS GETTING ON BUT I AM UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS VISIT WILL BE USEFUL.

DO LET ME HEAR FROM YOU.



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TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 18, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

AND PERSONAL

THINK I CAN DO.

THE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT GIVES THE WELL-KNOWN BACK SEAT DRIVERS
A FIELD DAY BUT NO MATTER HOW SERIOUS OUR SETBACKS HAVE BEEN,
AND I DO NOT FOR A MOMENT UNDERRATE THEM, WE MUST CONSTANTLY LOOK
FORWARD TO THE NEXT MOVES THAT NEED TO BE MADE TO SEEK THEM.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE OF GOOD HEART IN THESE TRYING WEEKS BECAUSE

I AM VERY SURE THAT YOU HAVE THE GREAT CONFIDENCE OF THE MASSES OF

THE BRITISH PEOPLE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I THINK OF YOU OFTEN

AND I KNOW YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ASK ME IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT DURING THE LAST FEW
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Date_		OCT_	6.19	171		

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

February 20, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON

No. 107 I hope you can persuade Australian Government to allow proposed temporary diversion of their leading Australian Division to Burma. I think this is of utmost importance. Tell them I am speeding additional troops as well as planes to Australia and that my estimate of the situation there is highly optimistic and by no means dark. Harry is seeing Casey at once.

ROOSEVELT

Note: Original copy of this message delivered to Miss Tully 1750 2-20-42, due to the fact that it was added to in the President's handwriting.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.S. Hewart

Date OCT 6 1971

Bol

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

February 20, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON

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TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 21, 1942

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TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

NAME. YESTERDAY EVENING I SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CURTIN:

" PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR PRIME MINISTER CURTIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

I FULLY APPRECIATE HOW GRAVE ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN
REACHING A DECISION IN THE PRESENT SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO
THE DISPOSITION OF THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION RETURNING FROM
THE MIDDLE EAST.

I ASSUME YOU KNOW NOW OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SEND, IN
ADDITION TO ALL TROOPS AND FORCES NOW EN ROUTE, ANOTHER FORCE OF
OVER 27,000 MEN TO AUSTRALIA. THIS FORCE WILL BE FULLY EQUIPPED
IN EVERY RESPECT.

WE MUST FIGHT TO THE LIMIT FOR OUR TWO FLANKS - ONE BASED ON
AUSTRALIA AND THE OTHER ON BURMA, INDIA AND CHINA. BECAUSE OF OUR
GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION WE AMERICANS CAN BETTER HANDLE THE REINFORCEMENT
OF AUSTRALIA AND THE RIGHT FLANK.

I SAY THIS TO YOU SO THAT YOU MAY HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT
WE ARE GOING TO REINFORCE YOUR POSITION WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED.
MOREOVER, THE OPERATIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES NAVY HAVE BEGUN
AND HAVE IN VIEW WILL IN A MEASURE CONSTITUTE A PORTECTION TO THE
COAST OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date OCT 6 1971



ON THE OTHER HAND THE LEFT FLANK SIMPLY MUST BE HELD. IF BURMA GOES IT SEEMS TO ME OUR WHOLE POSITION, INCLUDING THAT OF AUSTRALIA, WILL BE IN EXTREME PERIL. YOUR AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IS THE ONLY FORCE THAT IS AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT. IT COULD GET INTO THE FIGHT AT ONCE AND WOULD, I BELIEVE, HAVE THE STRENGTH TO SAVE WHAT NOW SEEMS TO BE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

WHILE I REALIZE THE JAPS ARE MOVING RAPIDLY I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT, IN VIEW OF YOUR GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION AND THE FORCES ON THEIR WAY TO YOU OR OPERATING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD, YOUR VITAL CENTERS ARE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER.

WHILE REALIZE THAT YOUR MEN HAVE BEEN FIGHTING ALL OVER THE WORLD, AND ARE STILL, AND WHILE I KNOW FULL WELL OF THE GREAT SACRIFICES WHICH AUSTRALIA HAS MADE, I NEVERTHELESS WANT TO ASK YOU IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR WHOLE WAR EFFORT IN THE FAR EAST IF YOU WILL RECONSIDER YOUR DECISION AND ORDER THE DIVISION NOW EN ROUTE TO AUSTRALIA TO MOVE WITH ALL SPEED TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH FORCES FIGHTING IN EURMA.

YOU MAY BE SURE WE WILL FIGHT BY YOUR SIDE WITH ALL OUR FORCE UNTIL VICTORY.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Of Stewart



FOR PRIME MINISTER CURTIN

THANK YOU FOR YOURS OF 20th .

I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION IN SPITE OF
THE FACT THAT I CANNOT WHOLLY AGREE AS TO THE IMMEDIATE
NEED OF THE FIRST RETURNING DIVISION IN AUSTRALIA. I
THINK THAT AS OF TODAY THE PRINCIPAL THREAT AGAINST THE
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AND THAT WE CAN SAFELY HOLD THE AUSTRALIAN OR RIGHT FLANK.
ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FULLY EQUIPPED RHINFORCEMENTS ARE
GETTING READY TO LEAVE FOR YOUR AREA.

IN VIEW OF ALL THIS AND DEPENDING OF COURSE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEXT FEW WEEKS I HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERTING THE SECOND RETURNING DIVISION TO SOME PLACE IN INDIA OR BURMA TO HELP HOLD THAT LINE SO THAT IT CAN BECOME A FIXED DEFENSE. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES YOU CAN DEPEND UPON OUR FULLEST SUPPORT.

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FEBRUARY 22, 1942.

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Tamb you for yours af -. I forthy understand y weer position in aprite of the fact that I consect whally agree as to the immedente 2 mil of the first returning Neviceon in Australia. I think that an of baday the principal threat against The main leaves of anstrales and Burne tolan Coth of which ASHINGTON must be held at all costs is against The Burnea or laft flank, and that we can safely hold The anotalian is right flack. Additounal Elmericas feelly Egupped minforceourants for your area. In wirw of all the and defenting of course an Arentophurats in the next Low writes I hape your

well consider the possibility of diverting The Drawnof 8 cturning do vision L' vame place en India or Durmen to help hold That time 20 That it can Corean a fixed defence. Muder any corrematances your can depread upon ans full est ruppent

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ena Forder FEBRUARY 22, 1942

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ECRET FOR THE FOR From: Opnar forder FEBRUARY 22, 1942

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.X

No. 109 X AS TELEGRAM D.B.A. 22 WHICH WENT TO WAVELL LAST NIGHT SFEMS TO COVER ALL THAT IS IMPORTANT IN YOUR MESSAGE 0202A, I DO NOT CONSIDER ANYTHING FURTHER TO WAVELL IS NECESSARY AND HOPE YOU CONCUR.

> HAVE DIRECTED COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO EXAMINE ONCE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF SENDING NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS TO THE ABDA AREA BUT I AM NOT TOO HOPEFUL OF THIS BECAUSE OF JAPANESE CONTROL OF I THINK OUR PRESENT DISPOSITION AND PLANS NAVALWISE ARE BETTER IN THE LIGHT OF ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. ** BOY

> > Russuel

Heminer





230210 NCR 3460

FEBRUARY 22, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

1. IN VIEW OF CURTIN'S FINAL ANSWER IN THE NEGATIVE TO
OUR STRONG REQUEST I HAVE SENT HIM THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH
IN THE HOPE WE CAN GET THE NEXT CONTINGENT TO HELP HOLD BURMA
LINE.

FOR CURTIN QUOTE, THANKYOU FOR YOURS OF 202 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND 2. YOUR POSITION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT I CANNOT WHOLLY AGREE AS TO THE IMMEDIATE NEED OF THE FIRST RETURNING DIVISION IN AUSTRALIA. I THINK THAT AS OF TODAY THE PRINCIPAL THREAT AGAINST THE MAIN BASES OF AUSTRALIA AND BURMA BOTH OF WHICH MUST BE HELD AT ALL COSTS IS AGAINST THE BURMA OR LEFT FLANK, AND THAT WE CAN SAFELY HOLD THE AUSTRALIAN OR RIGHT FLANK. ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FULLY EQUIPPED REINFORCEMENTS ARE GETTING READY TO LEAVE FOR YOUR AREA. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS AND DEPENDING OF COURSE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS I HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERTING THE SECOND RETURNING DIVISION TO SOME PLACE IN INDIA OR BURMA TO HELP HOLD THAT LINE SO THAT IT CAN BECOME A FIXED DEFENSE. UNDER ANY CIRCUM-STANCES YOU CAN DEPEND UPON OUR FULLEST SUPPORT ROOSEVELT UNQUOTE I AM WORKING ON ADDITIONAL PLANS TO MAKE CONTROL OF ISLANDS IN ANZAC AREA MORE SECURE, AND FURTHER TO DISRUPT JAPANESE

ADVANCES.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Houard

Date 967 6 1971

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Sealed Sent Til

(FORMER NAVAL PERSON - PAGE 2) FEBRUARY 22, 1942.

4. IN MONDAY NIGHTS SPEECH I AM LEAVING OUT PROPOSED REFERENCE TO GERMAN SHIPS RUNNING THE CHANNEL, BECAUSE OVER HERE THE FIRST BAD COMMENTS HAVE ABOUT DIED DOWN. ALL AGREE IT IS BEST NOT TO STIR UP THE CONTROVERSY AGAIN. I HOPE YOU CONCUR.

ROOSEVELT

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FEBRUARY 22, 1942.

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ROOSEVELT

Former Navallerede 1. In view of Curtues final amender in The negation to men strong request I have sent time the following despatch in The hope we can get The next contry mit to holf hold Burne line 2. Quete -Unquate 3. I Am working me adoletioner

THE WHITE HOUSE blus to make contral of islands in angue siea The more vecure, and further to disruft Japanese To revenues. 4. In Monday nights Eproch I am traving unt proposed reference to Termen ships running the Chamail, breaux over here The first bad carements have about stirl Haven. all agree it is birt mat

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

afam. I hope you concern.

Rusuch

TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 23, 1942

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

/// AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM HOPKINS.

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM ADDRESSED B.A.D. 510 FEBRUARY 21 FOR THE PRESIDENT, PARAGRAPH (11):

THE FLIGHT OF HEAVY BOMBERS ACROSS AFRICA TO THE FAR EAST
HAS CONTINUED WITHOUT ABATEMENT. THE ONLY CHECK TO MOVEMENT
OCCURRED BETWEEN INDIA AND NEI AND EVIDENTLY WAS IN OBEDIENCE
TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM ABDACOM BUT EVEN SO OUR REPORTS INDICATE
THAT THREE FLEW FROM CEYLON TO JAVA FEBRUARY TWENTY.

HARRY HOPKINS



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 2/11/72

hat pend.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

February 25, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON

The following is purely a personal thought based on very little firsthand knowledge on my part but it is something which has been concerning me more and more greatly since you left and since the East Indian and Malayan situation have grown worse. Please treat it as something I would say to you if you and I were alone.

I have been for many years deeply interested in the problem of the relations between Europeans and Americans on the one side with the many varieties of races in eastern and southern Asia and the Indies on the other side, although I personally have never visited the Far East.

There is no question in my mind that the old relationship ceased to exist ten or twenty years ago and that no substitute has yet been worked out except the American policy of eventual freedom for the Philippines which was formulated as far back as 1902 and has been followed with reasonable consistency ever since.

In somewhat similar circumstances the older policy of master and servant has not been altered by the Dutch in their Islands nor by you in the Straits Settlements or Burma, and this rather recent surge under the generic name of "Asia for the Asiatics" has in a sense come rather suddenly on the Dutch and the British, for the very good reason that

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

you and the Dutch have not had time to work out a different plan for the future.

, I recognize of course the obvious fact that India presents a much more complicated situation than the smaller Colonies or Islands, but there again the people of India feel that delay follows delay and therefore that there is no real desire in Britain to recognize a world change which has taken deep root in India as well as in other countries.

I feel that there is real danger in India now in that there is too much suspicion and dissatisfaction in too many places, and that resistance to Japan would therefore not be nearly as sincere and wholehearted as it should be. I wonder if there is sufficient spirit to fight among the Indian people.

I am thinking of the analogy of the United States after our Revolution ended. For several years we operated under a wholly unsatisfactory temporary arrangement known as "The Articles of Confederation". Thirteen States were going in thirteen different directions. A Constitutional Convention of very limited size worked out our present Constitution.

The delegates to this Convention were chosen rather haphazardly. They represented, however, different walks of life and different areas. They were by no means all politicians. They met in one small room for several months. Their proceedings were in secret and they evolved a document which is still pretty good today.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest consideration of calling in India a small group of not more than thirty or forty people, representing different groups, castes, occupations and geographies, asking them to bring in a temporary form or government to be recognized as a Dominion Government at once, and to be followed by a further small Convention in two or three years to recommend a more permanent structure of government. Meanwhile India would be operating with greater autonomy and as a Dominion. It should of course be pointed out that some such method should cause the people to forget hard-feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the dangers of Japanese domination and the advantages of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

I would have written you this were it not that I think time is of the essence and that the move should come from London rather than from India. I believe it all important that if any move is made by London, there should be no criticism that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion. Such a move is strictly in line with the world trends of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight you and I are making. But

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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Printed for the War Cabinet. October 1941.



Copy No. 32

D.O. (41) 17. October 7, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

WAR CABINET.

Defence Committee (Operations).

A NOTE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

(as amended and concurred in by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces).

- Renown awaits the Commander who first, in this war, restores the artillery to its prime importance upon the battlefield from which it has been ousted by heavily armoured tanks. For this purpose three rules are necessary:—
 - (a) Every field gun or mobile A.A. gun should carry a plentiful supply of solid armour-piercing tracer shot; thus, every mobile gun will become an anti-tank gun, and every battery possess its own anti-tank protection.
- (b) When guns are attacked by tanks they must welcome the occasion. The guns should be fought to the muzzle. Until the approaching tanks are within close range, batteries should engage them at a rapid rate of fire with H.E. During this phase the tracks of the tanks are the most vulnerable target. At close quarters solid A.P. shot should be fired; this should be continued so long as any of the detachments survive. The last shot should be fired at not more than ten yards range. It may be that some gun crews could affect to be out of action or withhold their fire, so as to have the superb opportunity of firing A.P. at the closest range.

(c) It may often happen as a result of the above tactics, especially when artillery is working with tanks, that guns may be over-run and lost. Provided they have been fought to the muzzle, this should not at all be considered a disaster but, on the contrary, the highest honour to the battery concerned. The destruction of tanks more than repays the loss of field guns or mobile A.A. guns. The Germans have no use for our captured guns as they have a plethora of their own types which they prefer. Our supplies are sufficient to make good the deficiencies.

The principle must be established by the Royal Artillery that it is not good enough for tanks to attack a group of British batteries properly posted, and that these batteries will always await their attack in order to destroy a good proportion of tanks. Our guns must no more retreat on the approach of tanks than Wellington's squares at

Waterloo on the approach of hostile cavalry.

2012

2. The Germans made a practice from the beginning of their invasion of France, and have developed it consistently since, of taking what they call "flak" artillery with their most advanced parties and interspersing all their armoured and supply columns with it. We should do the same. The principle should be that all formations, whether in column or deployed, should be provided with a quota of A.A. guns for their protection. This principle is applicable to columns of all kinds, which should be freely supplied with machine guns as well as with Bofors as the supply of these weapons becomes more plentiful.

 250 Bofors are now being sent to General Auchinleck for him to use in the best possible way with all his columns, and at all the assembly points of his troops or refuelling stations required in the course of offensive operations.

Nevermore must the army rely solely on aircraft for its protection against attack from the air. Above all, the idea of keeping standing patrols of aircraft over moving columns should be abandoned. It is unsound to "distribute" aircraft in this way, and no air superiority will stand any large application of such a mischievous practice.

4. Upon the Military Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East announcing that a battle is in prospect, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief will give him all possible aid irrespective of other targets, however attractive. Victory in the battle makes amends for all, and creates new favourable situations of a decisive character. The Army Commander-in-Chief will specify to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief the targets and tasks which he requires to be performed, both in the preparatory attack on the rearward installations of the enemy and for air action during the progress of the battle. It will be for the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief to use his maximum force for these objects in the manner most effective. This applies not only to any squadrons assigned to army co-operation permanently, but also to the whole air force available in the theatre.

or withhold their fire, so as to have the suporb opportunity of firing

5. Bombers may, if required, be used as transport or supply machines to far-ranging or outlying columns of troops, the sole object being the success of the military operation. As the interests of the two Commanders-in-Chief are identical it is not thought that any difficulty should arise. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief would naturally lay aside all routine programmes and concentrate on bombing the rearward services of the enemy in the preparatory period. This he would do not only by night, but by day attacks with fighter protection. In this process he will bring about a trial of strength with the enemy fighters, and has the best chance of obtaining local command of the air. What is true of the preparatory period applies with even greater force during the battle. All assembly or refuelling points or marching columns of the enemy should be attacked by bombers during daylight with strong fighter protection, thus bringing about air conflicts not only of the highest importance in themselves but directly contributing to the general result.

October 7, 1941.

W. S. C.

Printed for the War Cabinet. October 1941. g. Having record to the parity new existing between the British and

Correct Air Perces and the Russian factor, at is unlikely that the energy



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C.O.S. (41) 612. October 8, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

REGRADED WAR CABINET. UNCLASSIFIED

personnel per gan to certain be-Chiefs of Staff Committee.

AIR DEFENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

the factories torn their out and so get an everturier proportion of our limited Directice by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

WE cannot state how severe the air raids will be this winter or what the danger of invasion will be in the spring. These two vultures will hang above us to the end of the war. We must be careful that our precautions against them do not unduly weaken our Mobile Field Army and other forms of our offensive effort.

2. It would seem reasonable to fix the total of A.D.G.B. personnel at its present figure of 280,000 plus any additional recruitment of women that they can attract. This will give them at least 30,000 more than what we got through the air raids with last year. The proposed addition of 50,000 to a total of 330,000 cannot be supplied. Many more high and low-ceiling guns are coming to hand now. Some of these might be mounted in additional batteries, but unless A.D.G.B. can contrive by praiseworthy thought and ingenuity to man them within the limits of the personnel mentioned they will have to be kept in Care and Maintenance.

[22394]

MARIEROD BYTTERAM OFFICENTIES BILL TO FYSIC OFF SHY OF TRIZING OUR SI

- -3. Having regard to the parity now existing between the British and German Air Forces and the Russian factor, it is unlikely that the enemy would make heavy and continuous air attacks on Great Britain in combination with or as a prelude to Invasion. He would need to save up for that. We should feel a major air onslaught on this island as it developed. We should discern the assembly in the river mouths of Invasion craft and shipping. There would thus be a short but effective period of time in which to adjust ourselves to the particular form of attack.
- 4. A.D.G.B. must therefore become as flexible as possible and keep static defence at a minimum. For this purpose as large a proportion as possible of A.D.G.B. should be in a mobile form. General Pile should prepare schemes for giving the utmost reinforcement of mobile flak to General Brooke's Army. Sometimes they must take their guns from the site. In other cases a duplicate set of mobile guns may be made available. Thus we can shift the weight from one leg to the other as the need requires.
- 5. A similar kind of shuttle service is required for Coastal Defence. No more men (other than normal wastage) can be provided for the Coast batteries. A detailed study must be made of the coast to economise man-power in the batteries according to the strategic danger. This can be done either by reducing the personnel per gun in certain sectors, and thus reducing the degree of readiness, or by reducing the number of guns for which crews are provided. The demand for 9,000 additional Coast Defence gunners cannot be met. These must be used in the mobile and offensive spheres. However, should Invasion threaten, A.D.G.B. must not only liberate to the utmost its mobile forces, but must also be ready to provide additional gunners to bring the Coast batteries up to the highest level.
- Above all, we cannot go on adding gun to gun and battery to battery as
 the factories turn them out and so get an ever-larger proportion of our limited
 trained man-power anchored to static and passive defence.
- 7. General Pile should be assisted in every way to prepare schemes for increasing the mobile flak of the Army and reinforcing the Coast batteries while at the same time without any addition (apart from women) to his numbers, 280,000, maintaining the indispensable minimum which served us so well last year.
- The Chiefs of the Staff Committee is requested to advise and consider what proposals should be made to give effect to the foregoing principles.

within the limits of the personnel mentioned they will have to be kept in Care

(Initialled)	W.	S.	C,

and Maisteness.

Great George Street, S.W. 1, October 8, 1941.

hem at least 30,000 more than what we got through

o july

Pages 1-19 [1942] 7

SECKES

PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL ISMAY FOR C.O.S.

COMMITTEE AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE.



PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL ISMAY FOR C.OS. COMMITTEE AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

I have availed myself of a few days quiet and seclusion to review the salients of war as they appear after my discussions here.

- war with the three Axis Powers, and desires to engage her trained troops as soon and as effectively as possible on fighting fronts. Owing to the shipping stringency this will not be possible on any very large scale during 1942.

 Meanwhile the United States' Army is being raised from a strength of a little over thirty Divisions and five Armoured Divisions to a total strength of about sixty Divisions and ten Armoured Divisions. About 34 million men are at present held or about to be called up for the Army and Air Force (over a million). Reserves of manpower are practically unlimited, but it would be a mis-direction of war effort to call larger numbers to the armed forces in the present phase.
- It does not seem likely that more than between a quarter and a third of the above American forces can be transported to actual fighting fronts during the year 1942. In

1943, however, the great increases in shipping tonnage resulting from former and recent shipping programmes should enable
much larger bodies to be moved across the oceans, and the
Summer of 1942 may be marked by large offensive operations
which should be carefully studied meanwhile.

- The United States Air Force, already powerful and rapidly increasing, can be brought into heavy action during 1942. Already it is proposed that strong bomber forces, based on the British Isles, should attack Germany and the invasion ports. American Fighter Squadrons can participate in the defence of Great Britain and the domination of such parts of the French shore as are in Fighter reach. Additional United States' Fighter and Bomber forces are much needed in Egypt and Libya, and it may be that the attack of the Roumanian oilfields from Persia by the heaviest American bombers is approject which should be entertained. Meanwhile, also, continuous streams of American bombers are proceeding both westward and eastward to the Pacific theatre of war, which will, of course, be the main scene of United States' air action in 1942.
- 4. The Declaration by the President to Congress of the enormous increases in United States' output of munitions and

shipping to proceed during 1942, and reach full flow in 1943, makes it more than ever necessary for Hitler to bring the war to a decision in 1942 before the power of the United States can be fully brought to bear. Hitler's need to invade the British Isles has always been great. The difficulties of the operation are also very great. Our preparations to resist have continually improved during the past year, and will be still further augmented by the time the Spring invasion season is reached. Improvements in British preparations comprise:

- (a) a far better trained and equipped Army;
- (b) stronger and more elaborate beach defences, including substantially increased coast batteries;
- (c) the marshalling by the Spring of between
 three and four thousand medium and heavy
 tanks in Great Britain, forming the equivalent of seven or eight Armoured Divisions;
- (d) by the need imposed upon the invader, arising from the above, of bringing a very large invading Army across the sea, with consequent aggravated difficulty of finding the shipping

and of assembling it in the ports and river mouths, and of the greater target presented to British naval and air action.

- (e) by the increase in the actual and relative power of the British Fighter Command which can now, instead of fighting at odds, bring superior numbers to bear upon the enemy Air Force over British soil, and can moreover dominate the French coastal regions nearest to the British Isles, viz., from Dunkirk to Dieppe, during the daytime, thus permitting daylight bombing of the nearest and most dangerous regions of hostile embarkation.
- Notwithstanding all the foregoing, we must continue to regard the invasion of the British Isles in 1942 as the only supreme means of escape and victory open to Hitler. He has had the time to prepare, in very great numbers, tank transporting vehicles capable of landing on any beach. He has no doubt developed air-borne attack by parachutes, and still more by gliders, to an extent which cannot be easily measured. The President, expressing views shared by the leading

American strategists, has declared Great Britain an essential It is indeed the only place fortress of the United Nations. where the war can be lost in the critical campaign of 1942 about to open. It would be most imprudent to allow the successful defence of the British Isles to be hazarded. have, of course, to continue to send about 40,000 men a month, with proportionate munitions and air forces, to the Armies of the Middle East. We have to send, as soon as shipping can be found, several additional Divisions to the Far East, or to replace Divisions withdrawn from the Middle East for the Far East. We also hold certain Divisions ready for particular overseas enterprises. The naval position in the Eastern Mediterranean also requires a very marked increase in British air power along the North African and Levantine shores. We must, therefore, face a continued outward flow of strength from the British Isles, and apart from equipment and armour there is no way in which our home defence army can be Indeed, the despatch of further Divisions abroad cannot be replaced by us.

6. The sending of four United States' Divisions (one armoured) into Northern Ireland is therefore a most necessary war measure, which nothing should be allowed to prevent.

The replacing of the British troops in Iceland liberates an additional British Division. It is suggested, however, that the United States' authorities should be asked to consider:

- (a) the training in Iceland of as many troops as

 possible to work in mountains and under snow

 conditions, as only the possession of such

 trained mountain and ski troopsiin considerable

 numbers can enable liberating operations in

 Scandinavia to be prepared for the future; and
- (b) that the American troops once settled down in the North of Ireland should pass in rotation, first by Brigades and then by Divisions, for tours of duty on the beaches of England and Scotland. This would be of interest to the American troops as well as adding to their experience and the defence of the island.
- (c) It is further suggested that, in the absence of other more urgent calls, American Divisions beyond those already under orders may be sent into the United Kingdom where they can if head to

7. The Operation "SUPER-GYMNAST" might become ripe, or might be forced upon us in the near future by inconsiderable

political or military events. It would be a misfortune if it were to interrupt the movement called "MAGNET". Provided the situation in North Africa, France or Spain, undergoes no sudden deterioration, a month or six weeks' delay might be accepted. Moreover, the military fact which would set French North Africa in a foment and bring matters to a head would be the arrival of General Auchinleck's vanguard, at the frontiers of Tunis. cannot tell yet if this will be possible yet certainly the resistance of the enemy in Cyrenaica; the possibilities of General Von Rommel withdrawing, being able to escape with a portion of his troops; the reinforcements which have probably reached Tripoli, and others which must be expected during the delay, and above all, the difficulties of supply for our advancing troops - all will retard, or may even prevent the full completion of ACROBAT. We are therefore in a position to study SUPER-GYMNAST more thoroughly, and to proceed with MAGNET with the utmost speed.

8. For reasons which are know, the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean is greatly in excess of the British, and it is only the poor morale of the Italian Fleet that enables us to dispute the command of the sea, having regard

especially to the very numerous well posted air_bases which the enemy has in Tripoli, in Sicily, in Italy, in Greece and in Crete. The concentration of German aircraft in large numbers at these air bases and the number of U-boats they maintain in the Mediterranean, may conceivably portend an overseas expedition to the African shore, or alternatively an attack upon Malta, that cruel thorn in their sides. It is, therefore, most important that the maximum air-power - bomber, fighter and torpedocarrying types - we can gather must be installed along that portion of the North African coast which is under our Substantial British reinforcements are already on the way. The employment of American squadrons, based primarily on Egypt and extending westwards, would be invaluable. It would be for our advantage to develop air war in the Mediterranean on the largest scale on both sides, with constant bombing of enemy airfields and sea-traffic. The German front-line Air Force is already less strong numerically than the British. A considerable portion of it must now be left opposite Russia. But the bulk of the British Air Force has to be tied up at home/at the present time a much smaller concentration of German bombers and

fighters, and yet not able to be moved because of the good interior communications possessed by the enemy and his power of rapid transference. In addition, there is the Italian Air Force to consider. What comparative value should be placed upon them is a matter of opinion.

The object we should set before ourselves is the 11. wearing down by continuous engagement of the German Air This is being done on the Mussian front. On the British front it can only be done to a limited extent, unless the enemy resumes his bombing or daylight offensive. But in the Mediterranean the enemy shows an inclination to develop a front, and we should meet him there with the superior strength which the arrival of American Air Forces can alone give. It is of the utmost importance to make the German Air Force fight continuously on every possible occasion, and at every point of attack. We can afford the drain far better than they can. Indeed; like General Grant in his last campaign, we can almost afford to lose two for one, having regard to the immense supplies now coming forward in the future. Every German aircraft or pilot put out of action in 1942 is worth two of them in 1943. It is only by the strain of constant air-battle that we shall be able to force his consumption of air-power to levels which are

beyond the capacity of his air-plants and air schools. In this way the initiative may be regained by us, as the enemy will be fully occupied, as we have been hitherto, in meeting day to day needs a keeping his had alone unter.

Coming further east we must recognise the very 12. great deliverance to us afforded by the successful Russian resistance along the Don and in the Crimea, carrying with it the continued Aussian command of the Black Sea. Three months ago we were forced to expect a German advance through the Caucasus to the Caspian and the Baku oilfields. That danger is almost certainly staved off for perhaps four or five months till the winter is over and, of course, continued successful Russian resistance in the south gives complete protection to us. This fact alone has enabled us to divert the 18th Division, the 17th Indian Infantry Division and to plan the withdrawal of two out of the three Australian Divisions in Palestine, together with considerable air reinforcements and much material, from the Levant-Caspian front to the new emergencies in Malaya and the Far East. It must be emphasised that we could not possibly have provided for the Libyan operations, the maintenance of the Levant-Caspian front and the Malayan needs simultaneously. Even without the war with Japan we could

only have maintained a very doubtful defence of Palestine, Iraq and Persia.

- 13. The danger may, however, recur in the late Spring. The oil strangency which is already serious in Germany and the German conquered countries, makes the seizure of the Baku and Persian Uilfields objects of vital consequence to Germany, second only to the need of successfully invading the British Isles. No-one can forecast the future course of the Russo-German struggle. Evidently the Germans will suffer increasingly very heavy losses during the winter. They may even sustain disasters so great that the Russian counter-strokes will reach the former frontier with consequences to the Nazi regime, both military and internal, which cannot be measured. On the other hand, the enormous power of the German Army may be able to reassert itself as soon as weather conditions improve. In this case they might well be content to adopt a defensive attitude along the northern and central sectors of the Kusso-German front, and thrust an offensive spearhead south-east through the Caucasus to the oilfields which lie beyond.
- them passage through Anatolia to attack Syria, Palestine and Egypt. It would, however, seem unlikely, first that Turkey, in view of the Mussian strength in the north and 4

the British activities in Egypt and Libya, and also of the world situation, now that the United States is a full belligerent Secondly, in the event of a Turkish refusal it seems unlikely that Germany would, after her Russian losses, wish to bring into the field against her the 50 Turkish Divisions by which the inhospitable and difficult regions of Anatolia would certainly be stubbornly Moreover, if the south-eastward spear-thrust defended. through the Caucasus were successful, the Anatolian line of advance would not be indispensable to the acquisition of The resistance of Turkey as a friendly the oilfields. neutral should be stimulated in every way, and especially by sending whatever supplies are possible in aircraft, anti-aircraft, tanks and anti-tank equipment. Great Britain has already made promises to aid the Turks with considerable air and land forces if they are attacked and resist. Our ability to fulfil these promises has, however, been prejudiced by the diversions necessary for making head against Japan. On the whole, however, it would seem reasonable to assume that the main danger to be faced in the spring of 1942 in this theatre will be a break-down in Russian defence of the Caucasus and Baku, and the German advance thence to the oilfields of Persia, and to Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf.

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15. We thus see ourselves drawn away towards the West by CRUSADER, ACROBAT and perhaps GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST, while at the same time we are drawn farther to the East by the increasing scale of the Japanese war. How are we to meet the danger outlined in the two preceding paragraphs? It will not be possible for Great Britain to replace the 18th British, 17th Indian, and two Australian Divisions moved or already assigned to the Far East, especially if GYMNAST or SUPER-GYMNAST should develop. The monthly drafts for North Africa, for the Levant-Caspian front and for the Malayan theatre, which have already averaged for many months 35,000 a month, will probably rise to 50,000 if existing units are to be maintained and if the necessary British contingents of the five new Divisions being raised in India are to be supplied. This will strain to the utmost both the escorts and the shipping necessary to move these monthly convoys in and out of the danger zones in the British Isles, and three or four months' round voyage via the Cape of Good Hope to Suez, Basra or Malaya. It is doubtful whether more than one, or at the outside two, new Divisional formations can be transferred from Great Britain to the various eastern theatres in six or even eight months. It would not be wise to call upon India for further reinforcements for the Levant-Caspian theatre, as all her resources will be needed

to nourish the war against Japan in the Malayan theatre, to defend Burma (and it may be India) and keep open the Burma After the move to the Far East of the Koad to China. Divisions mentioned above has been completed we shall, therefore, have in the Levant-Caspian region only the 5th Indian Division in Cyprus, the 50th British Division at Baghdad, one Australian and one Armoured Division (as yet only partly formed) in Palestine, the 8th, 9th and 10th Indian Divisions in Persia and Iraq + total 7 Divisions. We shall have in Egypt and North Africa three British Armoured, the 70th British, the New Zealand Division, 2 South African Divisions, Mh Indian Division and various British Brigade Groups and Polish and French contingents the equivalent of, say, three Divisions - total 11 Divisions. It seems likely that this force will be fully occupied in maintaining the North African shore, especially if the fighting front should extend westwards into Tunis.

16. It is a question to be profoundly considered whether the United States would not be wise to contemplate the development of an American Army, based on the Persian Gulf ports, to operate to the northward with the British and Empire forces set out above. The monster liners sailing from United States' east coast ports could perhaps find their fullest employment in carrying American troops through

the great ocean spaces via the Cape to the Persian Gulf. If an American Army of six or eight Divisions could be developed north of the Persian Gulf, it would, added to the seven we have and proportionate air forces, with any reinforcements we can send, be a powerful factor in the war against Germany. Whether this Army of, say, 15 Divisions, or any part of it, should stand purely on the defensive or should move forward to the Caucasus and even to the Russian southern front north of the Black Sea, would be dependent upon events on the Russo-German front, on where that front would be standing in the third quarter of 1942 and on the development of the communications by road and rail from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. It must be observed that any large force moved and maintained from the Persian Gulf in the Caspian basin will, of course, choke the southern warmswater supply lines by which it is proposed to carry munitions into Russia. If nothing can be done and the Russian southern front is beaten in, a frightful gap will be open which at present there is nothing in sight to fill, and the loss of the oilfields of the Caspian and Persia, and of all the regions between the present Kussian front and the frontiers of India cannot be excluded from our thoughts. It is suggested that the Joint Staffs should study and

report on the possibilities which are open, the precise object being the development of at least fifteen Divisions in the Levant-Caspian theatre.

FAR EAST

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN.

- It is generally agreed that the defeat of Germany 17. entailing a collapse will leave Japan exposed to overwhelming force whereas the defeat of Japan would not by any means bring the world war to an end. Moreover, the vast distances in the Pacific and the advantageous forward key-points already seized or likely to be seized by the Japanese will make the serious invasion of the homelands of Japan a very lengthy business. Not less lengthy will be the piece-meal recovery, by armies based mainly on Australia and India, of the islands, airfields and naval bases in the south-west Pacific area now confided to General Wavell. It seems, indeed, more probable that a decision can be reached sooner against Germany than against Japan. In any case, we cannot expect to develop adequate naval, air and military superiority in the aforesaid area for a considerable time having regard to the calls made upon them and the limitation of shipping.
- 18. While, therefore, it is right to assign primacy to the war against Germany it would be wrong to speak of our standing on the defensive against Japan; on the contrary, the only way in which we can live through the intervening period in the Far East before Germany is defeated is by

regaining the initiative albeit on a minor scale. Certain measures stand out clearly and are indeed imposed upon by events:

- (a) The Philippines must be held as long as possible if only to detain Japanese forces there.
- (b) The supply lines to China via Burma must be kept open and fought for with the utmost energy.
- (c) The Singapore fortress and its approaches must be defended to the utmost limit.
- (d) The Dutch Possessions in JAVA and SUMATRA must be disputed on a constantly increasing scale.

19. None of the above defensive operations will be successfully accomplished apart from the development of a counter-stroke offensive on a minor, but nonetheless, considerable scale. In a theatre of a thousand islands, many capable of being converted into make-shift air and naval bases, insoluble problems are set to purely passive defence. The Japanese having obtained temporary command of the sea, and air predominance over considerable areas, it is within their power to take almost any point they wish apart from the fortress of Singapore. They can go round with a circus-force and clean up any local garrisons we or the Dutch have been able so far to hold. They will seek to

secure their hold by a well-conceived network of air bases and they no doubt hope to secure, in a certain number of months, the possession of the fortress of Singapore. in possession of this as well as Manila, with their air bases established at focal points, they will have built up a system of air and naval defence capable of prolonged They may succeed in doing this, in which case resistance. the end of 1943 or 1944 may well see they still ensconsed in the Possessions they have so easily won. On the other hand, the wider they are spread the greater the weight of and the larger the target they expose. Their air-power cannot be replenished the war upon them/ or maintained at strength comparable to that of United States and Great Britain. The naval superiority of the United States, to which Great Britain will contribute to the best of her ability, ought to be regained by the summer of 1942.

(to be continued)

It is not proposed here to discuss the steps by 20. which the American-British naval superiority will be attained. Thereafter, or at least as soon as possible, raids should be organized upon islands or seaports which the Japanese have seized. The President has, I understand, ordered the formation of a force akin, on the West Coast of America, to the Commandos. force, apart from its individual qualities, will be exceptionally valuable by gaining key-points and lodgments in amphibious It would require to be supported by a number of operations. small Brigade Groups whose mobility and equipment would be exactly fitted to the particular task foreseen, each task being a study It is not necessary, unless required on strategic in itself. grounds, to stay in the captured or re-captured islands. will be sufficient to destroy or make prisoners of the garrison, demolish any useful installations, and depart. The exact composition of the forces for each undertaking and enterprise is a matter for scharate study. According to our experiences it would seem essential that there should be adequate cover by sea-borne aircraft and detachments of tanks and tank landing craft. enemy cannot possibly be prepared and must be highly vulnerable at many points. After even a few successful enterprises of

experiences to the troops and Commanders for instructional purposes, he will be remaind out of holding places weakly, and will be forced to concentrate on a certain number of strong points. It may then be possible for us to secure very easily suitable islands, provided we do not try to hold too many, in which air and re-fuelling bases of a temporary or permanent character can be improvised. The establishment of a reign of terror among the enemy's detached garrisons would seem to be an extremely valuable preliminary to the larger operations for re-conquest and the building up of strong bases as stepping stones from Australia northward.

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Printed for the War Cabinet. October 1941.



Copy No.

D.O. (41) 18.

October 9, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Defence Committee (Operations).

ARMY STRENGTHS.

DIRECTIVE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

WE have now in the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) 26 standard motorised infantry divisions and the Polish division, total 27, well equipped with guns and transport, with an average strength of about 15,500 men, with 10 Corps organisations and Corps troops (61,000). There are 8 county divisions for work on the beaches, averaging about 10,000, without artillery other than coast artillery and with little transport. We have 5 armoured divisions and 4 Army Tank brigades; the whole comprising 14 armoured brigades (with 5 divisional elements); 4 Brigade Groups with artillery and transport; 7 infantry brigades and 12 un-brigaded battalions: furthermore, 8 aerodrome defence battalions and the 100,000 men in the Home Defence and Young Soldiers' battalions.

2. It is proposed to transform this organisation into 27 standardised divisions (hereinafter to be called Field Divisions), plus the Polish Division (which will have an armoured element), total 28; and to increase the armoured forces to 7 armoured divisions with 8 Army Tank brigades, the whole comprising 22 armoured brigades (with 7 divisional elements). The 4 Brigade Groups are to remain. Instead of the 8 county divisions and other units mentioned above, [23003]

47

there will be 13 brigades, plus the equivalent of 2 Ally brigades, and 8 "Detached Battalions"; the foregoing constituting the Home Field Army, which can thus be reckoned the equivalent of 45 divisions. In addition, there will still be the 8 aerodrome battalions and the Home Defence and Young Soldiers' battalions.

- 3. The object of these changes is to increase the war-power of the army, particularly in armoured troops; and to provide additional field, anti-tank and flak artillery, including that required for 5 additional Indian divisions, to be formed during 1942. For this last purpose also it will be necessary to provide up to 17 British battalions for the Indian Army.
- 4. No reduction in the force mentioned in para. 2 is compatible with our war needs. To maintain it during the next nine months, i.e., to July 1, 1942; and also to maintain the drafts for the army of the Middle East, for India and for our garrisons in Iceland, Gibraltar, Malta and Hong-Kong, &c., with a normal wastage of 50,000 a quarter there must be provided an intake to the army of 278,000 men. Measures are being taken to provide this. The army also requires at least 142,000 more women above the 63,000 already recruited.
- 5. In my directive on A.D.G.B. I have proposed that the personnel should be fixed at 280,000 men and that the suggested increase of 50,000 be disallowed: also that the suggested increase of 9,000 in the Coast batteries should be disallowed. The savings thus provided will be applied towards strengthening the Field Army. Finally A.D.G.B. will continually endeavour to develop for the service of the Home Field Army the largest amount of mobile flak possible, and also a transferable force available to strengthen the coastal batteries should the Emergency Period of Invasion be instituted. As it is unlikely that the enemy could afford prolonged and widespread bombing of our towns in the advent of Invasion, a shuttle arrangement of this kind should be possible, enabling us to meet according to events either a sustained air attack or Invasion. The Anti-Aircraft force is formed into 12 Divisions.
- 6. The Army of the Nile now consists of the 50th and 70th (formerly 6th) British Divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions with the Cavalry Armoured Division (forming) and two Army Tank Brigades; the three Australian Divisions; one New Zealand; two South African, one Polish and Foreign equivalent, and the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, total 16 Divisions. It is intended to reinforce the Middle East with two British Divisions, the 18th and 2nd, from the United Kingdom as convenient.
- 7. Apart from the 2 divisions mentioned above, India has in action in Persia and Iraq the 6th, 8th and 10th Indian divisions, and General Wavell proposes to send the 17th by the end of the year. During 1942, 4 extra Indian divisions and one Indian armoured division will also take the field; total 9.
- For the defence of India, there will remain the equivalent of 3 British divisions and 5 Indian divisions, over and above those which will operate outside India.

9. There remain our garrisons abroad, to wit:

Iceland (C)—the equivalent of 1 division.

Gibraltar and Malta—that of 2.

Singapore—that of 3.

Aden, Hong Kong and other minor garrisons—that of 1.

Total division-equivalent of garrisons, 7.

10. If we estimate our Army in divisions or their equivalent, the general layout for 1942 is as follows:—

United Kingdom						45
Anti-Aircraft divisions						12
	•••	•••	•••			
Army of the Nile	***		• • • •	•••	***	16
Army of India in Iraq a	nd P	ersia				9
Army of India at home						8
Fortress Garrisons						7
Native African Divisions						2
						_
Grand total						99

11. It is our duty to develop, equip and maintain all these units during 1942.

W. S. C.

Field

10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, October 9, 1941. - Jan 3. 15.42.

My deur Mr. President,

coult be beto anymore. I mayor the ends feetered fretered statement which he would around 2 porm, which will great the thinks states many from their run, but he to the British morning papers have it also for Sunday morning. I cannot fit in the trustrature terming to the world will keep to the terming.

Pluse let me know you miber

mished. Churchell

AT: THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MR. HOPKINS.

Shall I send this direct, or will you handle it yourself?

me

5. 1. 42

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

MR. PRESIDENT

Please will you very kindly consider giving a few rationed carrots to the Dons to help stave off trouble at Gibraltar? Every day we have the use of the harbour is a gain, especially in view of some other ideas we have discussed. I am told it only needs a word to Wallace.

m

5. 1. 42



10, Downing Street, Whitehall,

FLORIDA.

January 6, 1942


Dear Mr. President,

We have been greeted on arrival by this cutting from the local paper. This shows that all the trouble you took about preserving secrecy has been in vain. Tommy is plainly identifiable.

Some grand, Churchell

MIAMI DAILY NEWS 5-1-1942 THE MIAMI

HOLD EVERYTHING



"Hard work is the thing that will win this war - we must keep at it night and day!"

CECRES

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE WASHINGTON, D.C.

Prime Minister

Reference the attached Minute about New Caledonia (Flag "A"), this question arose from a review by the combined U.S. - British Staffs of the defence of island bases between Hawaii and Australia.

The United States pressed strongly for forces to be established in New Caledonia. As Australia were unable to do this, they undertook to send American forces.

New Caledonia lies on the important air route to Australia and the ABDA Area. Aircraft can reach Australia direct from Fiji without landing at New Caledonia, but it would be awkward if it fell into the hands of the Japanese. Moreover, the island has & principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only limited quantities. DECLASSIFIED

DATE AUG 2 8 1973

I do not know if Casey made any representations to the Americans, but certainly our people did not press for the despatch of troops to the island.

I understand from General Gerow (the U.S. D.M.O.) that the Americans wish to send reinforcements of 20,000 men to the Far East in any case, from which the detachment of initially, one brigade for New Caledonia would be made.

Three or four personnel ships will be required for the New Caledonia force (these of course would be no use for taking supplies to Russia); I gather that they intend to send the M.T. on later.

I am afraid in the time available I have been unable to obtain very precise details from the American Staff, since they themselves have not yet worked out the Far East convoy programme in detail.

I attach at Flag "B" the combined U.S. British report on the defence of Pacific
island bases; the passages referring to New Caledonia
are sidelined. As stated above, the proposals for
New Caledonia were initiated by the Americans.

L.CHollis

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

BRIGADIER HOLLIS.

OSTA-

The Prime Minister is still not contented about New Caledonia and does not think it should have such a high priority. How did it come into the business? Was it simply Casey, or did our people press it? Could it be pulled out now and stood over in favour of Mussia? How many ships are involved, observing that decisions are not final until London advices on shipping are received?

his return at midnight.

12.1.42.

U.S. ABC-4/8 British WW (JPC)8 COPY NO. 36

Washington, D.C. January 10, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES
BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 10, 1942:

W. P. SCOBEY Colonel, U.S. Army

Joint Secretaries

L. R. McDOWELL Commander, U. S. Navy


> R. D. COLERIDGE Commander, R. N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS

Declassification Branch, 19 June 1972

By RHPR, Date UUL 26 1912

COPY NO.



U.S. Serial ABC-4/8 British Serial WW (JPC)8 Washington, D. C. January 10, 1942.

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

By Authority of JCS Aclassification Branch, 19 June 1972 By RHORA Date JUL 26 1972

REPORT FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

COMMITTEE

Subject: Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

- 1. There is under development and approaching completion an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.
- 2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply and limited loading facilities.
- 3. It is planned also to establish at Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels and other shipping en route to and from the South West Pacific.
- 4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review.



In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division supported by strong naval and air forces.

- 5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.
- 6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa and Bora Bora.
- 7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.
- 8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been reserved of their requirements.

By Authority of JCS Declassification Branch, 19 June 1972

By RHESS, Date JUL 26 1912



Recommendations.

- 9. (a) That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Bora Bora. This is now being accomplished.
- (b) That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.
- (c) That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.
- (d) That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, even if this has to be at the expense initially of the ABDA area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.
- (e) Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.
- (f) That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.
- (g) The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.

By Authority of JCS Declassification Branch, 19 June 1972 By RASSa Date OUE 26 19/2

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8



DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

DEGLASSIFIED By Authority of 1	CS Declassi-
lication Bran	ch. 19 June 1972
ly Authority of July Reston Bran	dúl 2 6 1972

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1. NEW CALEDONIA	One Co. A.I.F. Approximately 3,000 Free French Forces (inadequately equipmed) 2 6 Fixed Defense Guns (Free French)	Army 1 Inf. Division (b regiments) 24 Heavy A.A. guns. 48 Light A.A. guns. 24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's. 12 A.A. Searchlights 8 155 m.m. C.A. guns 1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.) Air 1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft) 1 Hedium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft) Air Warning Service. Approximate Total Strength 40,000 See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).	Note (a). Does not include Free French Forces. This island is 230 miles long and 30 miles wide. Force envisages protection of the 3 to 4 air fields, and in the southern half of the island the harbour of Noumea. Note (b). The size of the garrison is subject to review as a result of early reconnais- sance and degree of assistance afforded by Free French; latter entails completing re-equipment of Free French.

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAV.		ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(p)	(c)	(d)
2. FIJI	Naval 1 Minesweeper 4 Motor patrol boats	Naval 1 Minesweeper 8 Motor Patrol Boats	
	Army 6 New Zealand Inf. Bns. 1 Regular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European) 1 Territorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 European). 28 Field Guns 2 6" C.A. guns at Momi 2 6" C.A. guns at Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 4 Bofors 4 3" A.A. guns 6 A.A. Searchlights	Army 8 Inf. Bns. 16 Heavy A.A. guns 28 Light A.A. guns 12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G. 12 A.A. Searchlights 2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for Momi 4 6" C.A. guns at Momi and Suva 2 4.7" C.A. guns at Suva 2 60 Pounders 2 6" Howitzers 28 Field Guns 1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks)	
	Air 9 Reconnaissance Bombers* 9 Miscellaneous Aircraft 4 Singapore Flying Boats 700 Men, Air Corps 25 Airplanes, Fighters) U.S. 2 Sets RADAR	Air 1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Aircraft) 1 Medium Bombardment Squad. (16 aircraft) 1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 aircraft) 4 Sets RADAR	Air U.S. Army is supplying the pursuit squadron. *Obsolete. Should be replaced by Hudsons due to New Zealand under approved allocations.

ANNEX TO ABC_4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
3. SAMOA	4 6" guns 18 3" A.A. guns 42 .50 M.G's. 42 .30 M.G's. 415 Marines 150 Samoan Marines 1 Regiment of Marines 12 75 m.m. guns 1 Co. Light Tanks (13 Tanks) Ho.'s Troops 6 5" guns Total - 5,015 U.S. Marines 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) 2 Sets RADAR	As in column (b)	
4. CANTON	45 Engineers 10 Medical and Communication 10 Artillery Personnel 2 75 m.m. guns 12 Machine guns	2 Cos. Inf. Rifle 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal50 A.A. M.G's. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal51 Navy guns 8 37 m.m. A/T guns 2 5" Navy Guns. 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft) 2 RADAR	

-3-

ANNEX TO ABC-4/8

PLACE	DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE	ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)	REMARKS
(a)/	(b)	(c)	(d)
5. CHRISTMAS ISLAND	125 Enginers, Medical and Signal Personnel 10 Artillery Personnel 12 Machine Guns 4 3 A.A. guns 2 75 m.m. guns 2 155 m.m. guns	l Bn. Inf. 4 guns C.A. A.A. (90 m.m.) 8 guns C.A. A.A. (37 m.m.) 12 Cal50 M.G's. A.A. 2 75 m.m. guns 2 5" Cal51 Navy guns 5 searchlights 1 Pursuit Sqdn. (25 aircraft) 2 Sets, RADAR	
6. PAIMYRA	479 Marines 4 5" guns 4 3" A.A. guns 8 .50 A.A. Machine Guns 8 .30 A.A. Machine Guns 2 Sets, RADAR	As in column (b) 1 Pursuit Squadn. (25 aircraft)	Certain other equipment now installed, details of which are not now available.
7. BORABORA	NONE	l Inf. Regt (- 2 Bns.) 12 guns A.A. (90 m.m.) 24 guns A.A. (37 m.m.) 24 Cal50 M.G's. 8 guns (75 m.m.) 2 CA Btrys (Harbour Defense) 6 Scout observation seaplanes (Navy) Services	

Eve.

HRL
This telegram must be closely paraphresed before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated January 17, 1942
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

265, January 17, 10 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

"Your message of January 16 relating to Wavell's 00048 of January 14: I entirely agree. Action was most urgent.

We got here with a good hop from Bermuda with a thirty mile wind. Will cable you again shortly."

WINANT

CSB

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ADD CHURCHILL, LONDON CHURCHILL ARRIVED AT PADDINGTON STATION, LONDON, IN MID-AFTERNOON ABOARD A SPECIAL TRAIN AND WAS GREETED BY MRS. CHURCHILL, MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, SERVICE OFFICIALS AND A CHEERING THRONG OF ABOUT 800. MRS. CHURCHILL LEFT THE ENGLAND-SCOTLAND FOOTBALL MATCH AT WEMBLEY STADIUM TO MEET HER HUSBAND AT THE STATION. 1/17--RS1014A

LONDON . -- PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL RETURNED TO ENGLAND BY FLYING BOAT TODAY.

CHURCHILL SAID HE HAD FLOWN 3,287 MILES IN 18 HOURS. CTHIS IS THE LAND-MILE DISTANCE FROM BERMUDA TO PLYMOUTH.

NAUTICAL MILES THE DISTANCE IS 2,860.) 1/17--R832A

W.C. File

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

1/14/42

Grace:

Miss Berney says the Prime Minister gave the President this morning a memo entitled ASSIGNMENTS. They want that title changed to read MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS DRAFT.

Also -- third line from the bottom of page instead of the word WITH, change to BY.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

CHIEF OF STAFF and CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

I enclose copy of telegram
handed me Saturday by Mr. Casey. I
think the Chiefs of Staff, American and
British, should give this consideration
at their next meeting.

F.D.R.

Only 1 carbon copy sent, for both to look at.

1-29-41 Brady ad. Stark has noted . Thanks h. au Does the just Milutal

Bol

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK:

Will you put this with the other message from the Prime Minister?

F.D.R.

BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 27th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I find that a mistake was made in the decyphering of the long message from the Prime Minister which I handed you this afternoon. In paragraph 4 of Mr. Curtin's message which was quoted in full, the word "not" was omitted towards the end of the first sentence. This sentence should therefore read as follows:-

"In the event of differing views on the Council the Australian representative in London might be in agreement with the United States representative on the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, but Australian approval of the point might not reach the President who is the final arbiter."

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASS Halifax

By Authority of British Sout.,

Telegram, 1/12/12

By RHOR Dat MAR 1 1972

BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 27th, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy
of a message for you from the Prime
Minister which was received at the
Embassy this morning.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President, Yours very sincerely,

Halifax

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of British Hat,
Telegram, 1/12/22
By Author Date MAR 1 1972

24



Message for the President from the Prime Minister dated January 27th.

I send you the following memorandum which has been prepared for me in the Dominions Office. Begins.

Before I got back to England I put to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand proposals which I discussed with you for joint [words undecypherable] supreme commander of ABDA area. As regards the means for coordinating in London the views of Australia and New Zealand the Dutch and ourselves, I proposed that a Far East Council on ministerial plane should be set up permanently with myself as Chairman and with representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. Its duties would be to focus and formulate the views of these four Governments to yourself whose views would also be reported to the Council.

Mr. Curtin replied on January 21st that the Australian War Council representing all the principal parties in Austrelia were unanimous in disagreeing with the proposed Council on the ground that it would be purely advisory and out of keeping with Australian primary interests in Pacific sphere. The Australian Government desired that a Pacific Council should be established in Washington comprising representatives/

representatives of the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, Australia, China and
the Netherlands and New Zealand. They urged
that this body should be a Council of action for
the higher direction of the war in the Pacific
and that it should be assisted by the Joint Staff
already established, on which the members proposed
that the Pacific Council would also have representatives of their services if they so desired.

I explained to Mr. Curtin on January 22nd that he had misapprehended the character of the proposed Council. It would not be purely advisory and Australia would have an equal voice on it with the United Kingdom. I asked him whether he intended to bring his proposal before you or wished me to transmit it to you.

Mr. Curtin has now telegraphed:

"At point which will be decisive we do not consider there is real, as distinct from nominal, equal voice."

He also adds

"It is desired, as this machinery
was evolved between the President and yourself,
that in the first instance our views be
submitted by you to the President for his
consideration."

By way of further comment Mr. Curtin has stated as follows:

- "(1) Instructions to Commander-in-Chief
 South West Pacific Area are issued by the
 President who will be advised by the combined
 Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington.
 Australia and New Zealand and the Netherlands
 East Indies are not represented on this body.
 It is a more logical and expeditious arrangement
 to have Pacific Council in Washington alongside
 the President and combined Staff than in London.
- "(2) With a Pacific Council in Washington relying for its advice on Allied Joint Staff there is less possibility of conflicting advice arising from technical advisers than if it is in London consulting another set of officers on the United Kingdom Dominions Joint Staffs. If the views of the members are irreconcilable and cannot be 'focussed', a satisfactory solution is more likely at Washington, the seat of final authority, than in London.
- "(3) The United Kingdom Government have stated that the combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee will 'receive opinion of the Council'. As the Council is a political body on Governmental plane, this procedure indicates that the functions of the Council are of an advisory and not executive rature.
- "(4) In the event of differing views on the Council the Australian representative in London might be in agreement with the United States representative on the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, but Australian approval of the point

might/reach the President who is the final arbiter.
With the Council at Washington, points of difference could be discussed with the combined staffs and the President or his representative on the Council would obtain first-hand knowledge of the Australian member's viewpoint.

- as the President and the Prime Minister are to discuss points that are in dispute or matters of great urgency, this also indicates that the proposed Council will be advisory as it will certainly not possess any final executive authority in London. Furthermore the views of the London Council are to be represented to the Joint Staff in Washington by the Prime Minister who is also to report to them any differences of opinion between the four members of the Council and in the last resort to reach a settlement with the President. The Council in Washington would facilitate a conclusion if the Prime Minister and the President are unable to agree.
- *(6) In short we strongly urge a Pacific Council at Washington, its jurisdiction not to be limited to ABDA Area and its personnel to be representative of the United Kingdom, Australia, China and New Zealand."

As regards New Zealand Mr. Fraser took a similar view. I thereupon sent him a fuller explanation of the proposals. He has since telegraphed again pressing for "a Far Eastern Council on lines suggested to be established in Washington with representation on

Governmental plane of United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zcaland, China and Netherlands". comment Mr. Fraser says "We think it not only desirable but necessary that there should be one coordinating authority - land, sea and air - for the whole war against Japan on which we should wish to be represented. While we do not decline cooperation in the proposal you have outlined with such amendments as may be possible to meet our views and will if necessary do our best to make it a success, we would not willingly accept any solution of this admittedly most difficult problem that does not afford us direct and continuous access to the power which under the arrangement so far reported is solely responsible for the conduct of naval operations in that portion of the world which includes [word undecypherable] Dominion". Ends.

I should be glad to know whether in your opinion these observations by the Australian and New Zesland Governments affect the view which we took together in Washington that coordination of views of these two Governments with those Governments of Great Britain and Netherlands should be effected in London.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK:

Will you put this with the other message from the Prime Minister?

F.D.R.

Secret from Halifax to the Pres. 1/27/42 re corrected paragraph 4 of Mr. Curtin's message which was from the Prime Minister.

PD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated February 1, 1942 Rec'd 11:30 p.m. January 31st

Secretary of State,

Washington.


473, February 1, 4 a.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Thank you so much about Dill. He will represent both C. of S. Committee in London and me as Minister of Defence.

WINANT

KLP



TK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC).

London

Dated February 1; 1942

Rec'd 1:33 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

474, February 1, 5 a.m., (SECTION ONE).

AND PERSONAL TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. Thank you for your telegram just received.

I send you herewith Wavell's message to me of 29th.

Please remember it was not written for your eye, but
we have got to a point where none of that matters.

Two. I entirely agree about the balance being maintained, especially as I guessed who you are leaving the supreme command vacancy for. Nothing must stand in the way of the big layout, namely, supreme commander, Wavell; deputy, unknown; naval, the Dutchman; air, Brett, or whoever you choose. I have cabled Wavell on these lines, as it would be well to have his view before us before final decision.

Three. I will reply to your paragraphs 3-7 inclusive after I have put them before the Cabinet on Monday. You may be sure there will be no

disagreements

-2- #474, February 1, 5 a.m., (SECTION ONE) from London.
disagreements between you and me.

Four. Your paragraphs 8 and 9. Thank you so much for all your kindness. I cannot tell you how sorry I was to leave the White House. I enjoyed every minute of it, which is more than all of those whos portraits adorn the walls can say.

WINANT

KLP

London
Dated February 1, 1942
Rec'd 2:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

474, February 1, 5 a.m. (3ECTION TWO).

Extract from telegram from General Wavell for Frime Minister.

Will you please give me your advice on following matter as you will doubtless know from your talks in Washington, general feeling of President and also of Dutch Government. It is position Admiral Hart.

One. I sent you private telegram number 0028

(also that 408) twelfth January giving you my first impressions of him. He is charming personality and knows his job but always takes pessimistic view of situation and refers frequently to his advanced age. He has said openly both to Dutch and myself that he considered himself old for this job. He told me other day that if I wished to have Dutch Admiral Helfrich instead of himself he would not mind.

Two. When I was in Batavia three days ago Governor General asked to see me and told me his Government had no confidence in Hart and considered Felfrich should have been appointed because of his local knowledge of these difficult waters.

WINANT

Dated February 1, 1942 Reo'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

474, February 1, 5 a.m., (SECTION THREE).

He told me that his Prime Minister - Covernor von

Mook had already expressed this opinion to high
authorities in Washington. He asked me whether he
should instruct von Mook to pursue matter further.

I said no and that if matter come up again in Washington von Mook should ask for official reference

to be made to me.

Three. As Hart had asked me previously whether I knew of any representations in Washington I informed him privately of gist of what Governor General had said.

Four. Matter now stands thus.

- (a) Am sure Hart only too willing to go if it can be done in some way that will save his face. He in fact practically said so to me today. He will not stand strain and should be replaced by younger and more energetic man.
- (b) From little I know of Helfrich he is capable and has plenty of anatiatiquities and, of course, local knowledge.

London Dated February 1, 1942

Rec'd 3:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

474, February 1, 5 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

He may do all right with present small forces but can have no experience of handling large fleets. I am not sure that (Americans?) would be happy under his command. He is inclined to express himself caustically about them. Dutch navy will not increase whereas there will we hope be much larger American and British naval forces in these waters before long. I do not think Dutch would raise any objections to appointment younger and more energetic American Admiral provided (underlined) they were at same time informed of intention to send considerable American reinforcements. This would be much best solution though Helfrich would be disappoint—

- Ed. He is jealous of position on my (staff?) of Terpoorten who is younger and junior in rank. Dutch navy considers itself of much greater importance than army.
- (C) Important that Palliser should remain as deputy, he is doing excellently.

(END OF MESSAGE) .

gres

AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated February 5, 1942 Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)
FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT

"PART ONE

One. I send you appended Wavell's reply in his own words.

Two. Please consider whether it would not be better to leave Hart where he is until the Unknown is available, observing that Hart is ashore and Helfrich will be afloat. The layout would then be announced all at once, namely:

Supreme Wavell.

Deputy-Supreme The Unknown.

Intendant-General Brett.

Air Peirse.

Army Ter Poorten, observing the Dutch claim to have the equivalent of six divisions on the ground.

Three. If you think this does not balance, Helfrich could stay at sea and you could substitute a younger American Admiral ashore at Abdacom H.Q.

for Hart.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
WINANT By R. H. Parks DatMAY 5 197

London Dated February 3, 1942

Reo'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Evidently Brett and Wavell have got on very close terms.

PART TWO.

Five. About the Pacific Council. I have not heard from Australia or New Zealand, to whom I sent text of your proposals. We still think it will be necessary to have Far East Council in London and that Australians will eventually agree. The Dutch beg that it may be here because it is to be on the ministerial level and it would be impossible for them to lose touch with Holland by transporting themselves to Washington. This is in accordance with your view. The Far East Council would, of course, make recommendations to you on military as well as political matters. The purely military would go from our Chiefs of Staff Committee in

London

-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from London.

London to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. The political aspects would be dealt with either through the Foreign Office and State Department, or, when necessary, between you and me.

WINANT

London

Dated February 3, 1942

Received noon

additional

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

Six. There is no reason why the above arrangements should not fit in with what you have offered Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch. In fact, I think it an admirable solution. The combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington would receive the military recommendations, on which the Far East Council would have been consulted beforehand, from our Chiefs of Staff Committee as arranged. But when the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington were dealing with something affecting the Abda or the Anzac area, or even larger matters, it would be natural for them to invite representatives of military missions of Australia, New Zealand and Holland to attend the discussion. The representatives of these missions would, of course, act under instructions from their Governments but they would be available to state their arguments in their own way and supply

-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE) from London.

additional information to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. I have a feeling this will gratify all parties and not clog in any way the major American and British machinery which, as you say, is already working well.

WINANT

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Seven. But what about China? She has not hitherto been concerned with Abda and Anzac. Nevertheless, two Chinese armies are coming down into Burma and on the Burma Road. I suggest China is primarily your concern and that you will weave her in with the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington while keeping us constantly informed and will bring everything to final solution there.

Eight. Pending receipt of replies from Australia and New Zealand I should like to know how this strikes you. Again it looks to me a pretty good and practical layout."

Wavell's reply herewith appended.

"One. I have discussed whole question with Brett and Peirse and have also informed Hart you have gist of correspondence since he has received message from Washington indicating that I had made -2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR) from London.

some representation to London and asked me rather repreachfully what I had done. He was charming about it but I think feels hurt.

WINANT

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)
PART TWO.

Both Brett and myself feel very strongly that
Peirse should remain in his present position for
time being with Brereton as his Deputy and that
Brereton should remain in his present position.
Peirse has experience in handling bomber forces in
war which no one else possesses. On other hand, he
has little administrative experience while Brett
has thorough grasp of whole problem of building up
American Force. It would be disastrous to make
change now. As time goes on and United States
Air Forces increase and American Commanders again
experience, it may be advisable for Peirse to drop
out and Brett or Brereton take over command of
whole Air Forces.

WINANT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

495 - London

Previous delivery of this telegram was not complete.

WDM

London

Dated February 3, 1942 Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE) FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT

"PART ONE

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Two. Please consider whether it would not be better to leave Hart where he is until the Unknown is available, observing that Hart is ashore and Helfrich will be afloat. The layout would then be announced all at once, namely:

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Army Ter Poorten, observing the Dutch claim to have the equivalent of six divisions on the ground.

Three. If you think this does not balance,
Helfrich could stay at sea and you could substitute
a younger American Admiral ashore at Abdacom H.Q.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFI

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

ALC

for Hart.

WINANT

MAY 5 1972

London Dated February 3, 1942

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Evidently Brett and Wavell have got on very close terms.

PART TWO.

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London

-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from London.

London to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. The political aspects would be dealt with either through the Foreign Office and State Department, or, when necessary, between you and me.

WINANT

London Dated February 3, 1942 Received noon

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

Six. There is no reason why the above arrangements should not fit in with what you have offered Australia. New Zealand and the Dutch. In fact, I think it an admirable solution. The combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington would receive the military recommendations, on which the Far East Council would have been consulted beforehand, from our Chiefs of Staff Committee as arranged. But when the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington were dealing with something affecting the Abda or the Anzac area, or even larger matters, it would be natural for them to invite representatives of military missions of Australia, New Zealand and Holland to attend the discussion. The representatives of these missions would, of course, act under instructions from their Governments but they would be available to state their arguments in their own way and supply additional

-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE) from London.

additional information to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. I have a feeling this will gratify all parties and not clog in any way the major American and British machinery which, as you say, is already working well.

WINANT

London

Dated February 3, 1942 Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Seven. But what about China? She has not hitherto been concerned with Abda and Anzac.

Nevertheless, two Chinese armies are coming down into Burma and on the Burma Road. I suggest China is primarily your concern and that you will weave her in with the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington while keeping us constantly informed and will bring everything to final solution there.

Eight. Pending receipt of replies from Australia and New Zealand I should like to know how this strikes you. Again it looks to me a pretty good and practical layout."

Wavell's reply herewith appended.

"One. I have discussed whole question with Brett and Peirse and have also informed Hart you have gist of correspondence since he has received message from Washington indicating that I had made -2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR) from London.

some representation to London and asked me rather representation to London and London

WINANT

Dated February 3, 1942

London

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)
PART THO.

Both Brett and myself feel very strongly that
Peirse should remain in his present position for
time being with Brereton as his Deputy and that
Brereton should remain in his present position.
Peirse has experience in handling bomber forces in
war which no one else possesses. On other hand, he
has little administrative experience while Brett
has thorough grasp of whole problem of building up
American Force. It would be disastrous to make
change now. As time goes on and United States
Air Forces increase and American Commanders again
experience, it may be advisable for Peirse to drop
out and Brett or Brereton take over command of
whole Air Forces.

WINANT

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 3:25 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

Three. Am not certain whether Brett's position is fully understood in America. As my Deputy he advises me on all questions operational and administrative, concerning American forces and in my absence acts for me and takes any necessary decisions on all matters and Abda area. As Intendant General his main function is to control building up of American air and other forces and passage of reinforcements through Australia. He also exercises general supervision on all administrative questions but all detail is done for him by his Deputies.

He thus has for all practical purposes control of American forces in Abda area and is not an administrative officer. Brett thinks this is not understood by Army and Air authorities in United States of America.

Four. If it is desire of United States of America to separate posts of Deputy and Intendant

General

-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX) from London.

General and to bring in MacArthur as Deputy I shall, of course, be quite agreeable. I shall still have Brett available to advise me on all matters connected with United States Air Force.

WINANT

London

Dated February 3, 1942

Rec'd 3:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

Five. As regards Naval Command I have already given my opinion. Helfrich will do job well and if Americans are prepared to accept him I am willing. He certainly knows his job. Whereas Hart has wanted some shoving, Helfrich is inclined to be impulsive and may want holding back. Palliser should in any case remain as Deputy.

Six. I must warn you that I feel Australians will demand higher representation and that they may be looking for place here for Blamey. Have had no reply to my 00467, 28th January addressed Melbourne, repeated War Office for Chiefs of Staff. When their corps arrives they will have larger force ground troops than anyone. I pointed this fact out to Governor General when he raised question of Helfrich with me. He said Dutch regarded Ter Poorten's position on my Hd. Qrs. as even more important than Helfrich's.

Seven.

-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN) from London.

Seven. Now that we are finding our feet here and beginning to function as Hd. Qrs. and team, less changes made at present the better."

End Wavell's reply.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINLNT

LLC

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 7 1942

437P M.

From_LONDON

1

To___POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

#25 NO. 3 FEBRUARY 7 X X X C

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND SECRET NO TWO FIVE PARA ONE YOUR LATEST RECEIVED TODAY PRO-POSING QUOTE TO LET THE DUTCHMAN GO IN AS ACTING CINC OF ALL NAVAL FORCES LEAVING ALL OTHER COMMANDS UNDER WAVELL AS AT PRESENT INCLUDING PEIRSE UNQUOTE IS ABSO-LUTELY AGREED BY ME AND WILL I AM SURE PLEASE WAVELL PD WHEN CERTAIN OTHER CHANGES ARE RIPE HE CAN REVIEW THE WHOLE SITUATION PARA TWO PD BOTH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAVE NOW AGREED TO OUR PLAN ABOUT THE PACIFIC COUNCIL BEING ON A MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN LONDON CONSTI-TUTED AND FUNCTIONING AS PROPOSED COUPLED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF THE DOMINIONS AND DUTCH ON THE COMBINED COS COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON ON OCCASIONS WHEN THEY ARE INTERESTED PD THIS IS A GREAT STEP FORWARD AND I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE NEW MACHINERY CMA PONDEROUS AND COMPLICATED THOUGH IT WAS BOUND TO BE CMA IS FUNCTIONING SMOOTHLY AND WELL PD I EVEN THINK WE MAY PLUME OUR SELVES A LITTLE

Answered by Pres- OM # 102.



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Action Copy

EDIFORM-FATO,-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., MINGARA FALLS, S. T.

D18 7/956PM

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY	7.	1942	
	-		

PART TWO

M.

From LONDON

To_POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

HAVING BROUGHT IT ALL INTO ACTION SO SOON PARA THREE PD I PRESUME YOU WILL TAKE CHINA UNDER YOUR WING AT WASHINGTON KEEPING US INFORMED CMA WHILE WE MAINTAIN OUR NORMAL CONTACTS PD I SENT A STRONG TELEGRAM TO WAVELL ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE YOU PERSONALLY ATTACH TO CHINA AND ABOUT BRINGING CHINESE TROOPS DOWN INTO BURMA PD THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CHINESE ARMIES HAVE NOW COME A LONG WAY SOUTH PD THRERE IS PLENTY OF RICE IN BURMA AND THIS PART OF THE FIELD LOOKS BETTER PD I AM DOING ALL I CAN TO REINFORCE BURMA FROM INDIA WITH BRITISH TROOPS AND REFILLING INISA FROM HOME PD AS YOU KNOW CHIANG IS VISITING THE VICEROY PD PARA FOUR PD ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH NATION INCREASINGLY CENTERS ITS HOPES ON THE UNITED STATES CMA THE VICHY ATTITUDE DESCRIBED BY YOU AND MANIFESTING ITSLEF IN MANY WAYS IS ROTTEN PD THEY HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN HELPING ROMMEL WITH SUPPLIES PD I SEE THAT VICHY DOES NOT LIKE THE MIQUELON ST PIERRE COMMUNIQUE AND THAT DARLAN THREATENS TO RETALIATE BY PUSHING AMERICAN

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FEBRUARY 7 1942

PART THREE

SECRET

437P

M.

From_LONDON

To_ POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

OBSERVERS OUT OF MOROCCO PD IT SEEMS TO ME VITAL THAT DONOVANS ACTIVITIES OF WHICH YOU TOLD ME SHOULD HAVE FULL PLAY AND THAT AMERICAN OBSERVERS SHOULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE WITHDRAWN PD OTHERWISE WHAT BECOMES OF GYMNAST AND ITS VARIANTS QUERY YOU HOLD THE MASTER KEY IN MARTINIQUE WHERE THERE ARE REPUTED TO BE TWENTY FRENCH SHIPS CMA FORTY FIVE HUNDRED SEAMEN MANY OF WHOM WOULD JOIN FREE FRENCH CMA FIFTY MILLIONS OF GOLD FROM THE EMIL BERTAIN CMA AND ONE HUNDRED AMERICAN FIGHTERS. PLANES WHICH CMA CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS REPORTS CMA ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KEPT IN GOOD CONDITION PD PARA FIVE PD I HOPE NOTHING WILL BE DONE TO GIVE GUARANTEES FOR THE NON OCCUPATION OF MADAGASCAR AND REUNION PD THE JAPANESE MIGHT WELL TURN UP AT THE FORMER ONE OF THESE FINE DAYS CMA AND VICHY WILL OFFER NO MORE RESISTANCE TO THEM THERE THAN IN FRENCH INDO CHINA PD A JAPANESE AIR CMA SUBMARINE AND OR CRUISER BASE AT THE DIEGO SUAREZ WOULD PARALYSE OUR WHOLE CONVOY ROUTE



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AC--4

PART FOUR

	FERRI	IARY	7	1942	
_					



_____M.

From LONDON

To___POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

BOTH TO THE MIDDLE AND TO THE FAR EAST PD WE HAVE THEREFORE FOR SOME TIME HAD PLANS TO ESTABLISH OUR-SELVES AT DIEGO SUAREZ BY AN EXPEDITION EITHER FROM THE NILE OR FROM SOUTH AFRICA PD AT PRESENT ACTION IS INDEFINITELY POSTPONED AS OUR HANDS ARE TOO FULL CMA BUT I DO NOT WANT THEM TIED PD OF COURSE WE WILL LET YOU KNOW BEFORE ANY ACTION IS RESOLVED PD PARA SIX PD I AM DELIGHTED MAGNET IS GOING FORWARD PD AS IT DEVELOPS I HOPE TO SEND FOUR MATURED BRITISH DIVISIONS ROUND THE CAPE FOR EMPLOYMENT WHERE MOST NEEDED CMA BUT THE SHIPPING IS THE STRANGLEHOLD PD PARA SEVEN PD SEVENTY PERCENT OF OUR FORCES WHICH FOUGHT IN MALAYA GOT BACK TO THE ISLAND PD ELEVEN CONVOYS OF STORES AND REINFORGEMENTS INCLUDING THE WHOLE EIGHTEENTH DIVISION AND OTHER STRONG GOOD A A AND A T UNITS ARE NOW DEPLOYED MAKING THE EQUIVALENT OF FOUR DIVISIONS CMA A FORCE VERY WELL PROPORTIONED TO THE AREA THEY HAVE TO DEFEND PD I LOOK FORWARD TO SEVERE BATTLES ON THIS FRONT CMA WHERE THE

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5 1972

PART FIVE

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	FEBRUA	RY 7.	1942	
-	F			M
A CONTRACTOR				

· From LONDON

To__POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

JAPANESE HAVE TO CROSS A BROAD MOAT BEFORE ATTACKING A STRONG FORTIFIED AND STILL MOBILE FORCE PD UNHAPPILY THE ONE HUNDRED HURRICANES WHICH HAVE ARRIVED CANNOT WORK FROM THE FOUR BOMBARDED AIR FIELDS EXCEPT IN SMALL DETACHMENTS PD THUS WE ARE CONDEMNED TO HEAVY AIR INFERIORITY PD TOBRUK WAS HELD FOR SIX MONTHS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS CMA SO I HAVE GOOD CONFIDENCE PD EVERY DAY THAT SINGAPORE HOLDS OUT GIVES WAVELL TIME TO GET A STRONG GRIP ON SUMATRA AND JAVA PD PARA EIGHT PD THE LIBYAN SETBACK HAS BEEN BOTH A SHOCK AND A DISAPPOINTMENT CMA BUT I DO NOT THINK AUCHINLECK HAS YET SHOT HIS BOLT PD PARA NINE PD YOUR TELEGRAM ABOUT LEASE DASH LEND PD I FOUND CABINET AT ITS SECOND MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT EVEN MORE RESOLVED AGAINST TRADING THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPERIAL PREFERENCE AS CONSIDERATION FOR LEASE LEND PD I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN OPPOSED OR LUKEWARM TO IMPERIAL PREFERENCE CMA BUT THE ISSUE DID NOT TURN ON THE FISCAL ASPECT PD THIS MIGHT WELL FORM PART OF

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PART SIX

FEBRUARY 7 1942

4770

437P M.

From_LONDON

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

A TARIFF OR ECONOMIC DISCUSSION CMA THE LATTER OF WHICH WE ARE READY TO BEGIN AT ONCE PD THE GREAT MAJORI-TY OF THE CABINET FELT THAT IF WE BARTERED THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPERIAL PREFERENCE FOR THE SAKE OF LEASE LEND WE S SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED AN INTERVENTION IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE CMA AND THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO DANGEROUS DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT AS WELL AS TO A FURTHER OUTBREAK OF THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA OF THE KIND YOU READ TO ME ON THE SECOND NIGHT OF MY VISIT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES BREAKING UP THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND REDUCING US TO THE LEVEL OF TERRITORY OF THE UNION PD WE SHOULD ONLY PLAY INTO THE ENEMYS HANDS IF WE GAVE THE SLIGHTEST COLOUR TO ALL THIS NONSENSE PD ON THE OTHER HAND WE ARE ALL FOR SWEEPING AWAY TRADE BARRIERS AND IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT WE SHALL BE WILLING TO GO FURTHER THAN CONGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION PD OUR WHOLE AIM IS TO WORK WITH YOU IN CONSTRUCTING A FREE CMA FERTILE CMA ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE POST WAR WORLD PD

> REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-73 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5

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FEBRUARY 7, 1942

PART SEVEN

437P M.


From LONDON

To__POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

I HOPE MOST EARNESTLY THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL MAKE
ALLOWANCES FOR ALL THESE DIFFICULTIES AND TRY TO HELP
FORWARD THE SUGGESTIONS BEING MADE BY US THROUGH THE
FOREIGN OFFICE AND STATE DEPARTMENT PD PARA TEN PD I
TRUST HARRY IS IMPROVING PD PLEASE GIVE HIM MY REGARDS
PD YOU WOULD I AM SURE LIKE AN AMERICAN FILM I SAW
LAST NIGHT QUOTE THE REMARKABLE ANDREW UNQUOTE PD IT
STIRS ONES DANDER PD PARA ELEVEN PD LASTLY CMA WOULD
YOU KINDLY NUMBER YOUR TELEGRAMS TO ME FOR SAKE OF
REFERENCE PD I SUGGEST THAT YOU BEIN AT ONE HUNDRED AND
I AT TWENTYFIVE CMA WHICH I AM NUMBERING THIS

PRIME



D13 10:54P

> Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FERRUARY 8, 1942

5:22 P M.

From___LONDON

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

To__POTUS

By R. H. Parks

Date

Copies furnished as noted:

#26

NUMBER 4 FEBRUARY 8, 1942

PERSONNAL AND SECRET NUMBER TWO SIX I SENT TO WAVELL YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT HART AND DUTCH ADMIRAL ACTING PROTEM PENDING A FURTHER GENERAL CHANGE PD I NOW SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING FROM WAVELL CLN QUOTE PRESUME I SHALL GET OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES PROPOSED PD PRESIDENTS MESSAGE NOT QUITE CLEAR PD HELFRICH IS NOT AT PRESENT ACTING C IN C OF ALL NAVAL FORCES BUT COMMANDS DUTCH FORCE ONLY PD UNQUOTE SHALL I TELL HIM YOU WISH HELFRICH TO BE ACTING C IN C ALL NAVAL FORCES CMA NOT ONLY DUTCH CMA OR WILL YOU DO SO FROM WASHINGTON QUESTION

PRIME

THIS MESG DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT 7:20 P. M. BY HIS ORDERS, COPY TO GENERAL MARSHALL, GENERAL ARNOLD, ADMIRAL STARK, AND ADMIRAL KING. ADMIRAL STARK AND ADMIRAL KING ARE TO CONFER WITH GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL ARNOLD, AND PREPARE AN ANSWER TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

COPY TO: ADMIRAL STARK

February 9, 1942.

From:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

To:

General Wavell.

In view Hart's request to be relieved, the designation of Vice Admiral Helfrich Acting Commander of Combined Naval Forces in ABDA Area directed Press release will be issued simultaneously in London and Washington at 2 p.m. GCT Wednesday February 11.

DECLASSIFIED By Authority o

927/495-1 3

Date APR 4 1972



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

February 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Churchill has started a series of telegrams beginning at 25. Will you arrange that all the President's wires that go to Churchill, whether through the State Department or otherwise, get consecutive numbers beginning with 100, which was put on the one attached.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

COPY

DI I FLD 1134AM/11 Received at the War Department Message Center Room 34441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

February 11, 1942

648 A.M.

From LONDON To POTUS



XXXC FIVE 11th

10/14-

NUMBER TWENTYSEVEN PARA ONE PD NOW THAT HELFRICH HAS BEEN MADE ACTING NAVAL CINC ABDA AREA AIR MINISTRY WOULD LIKE TO ANNOUNCE PEIRSE AS AIR CINC PD IT IS OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS APPOINTMENT WILL BE REVIEWED WHEN THE LARGER CHANGES YOU HAVE IN MIND COME TO PASS AND GENERALLY ALL WILL BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TELEGRAMS WE HAVE EXCHANGED PD PARA TWO PD FOR YOUR INFORMATION I MENTION WE NEED HARRIS CMA NOW ONE OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMBINED STAFFS COMMITTEE FOR THE BOMBER COMMAND OVER HERE CMA AND WE ARE REPLACING HIM BY AIR MARSHALL EVILL WHO IS ADMIRABLY SUITED TO REPRESENT US PD PARA THREE PD WE HAVE ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND MEN IN SINGAPORE ISLAND CMA OF WHICH MEARLY SIXTY THOUSAND ARE BRITISH OR AUSTRALIAN CMA FORTY THOUSAND BEING BRITISH PD I AM VERY GLAD WAVELL IS THERE TODAY PD THE BATTLE MUST BE FOUGHT TO THE BITTER END PD REGARDLESS OF CONSEQUENCES TO THE CITY OR ITS INHABITANTS PD EVERY GOOD WISH

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., Sto Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Answered by Pres # 10 %.

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

AMDI 12

902P

From LONDON

URGENT

FEBRUARY 12, 1942

420P M.

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

NUMBER # 28 FEBRUARY 12TH:

THIS IS MESSAGE NUMBER TWENTYFIGHT PARA ONE REFERENCE YOUR ONE ZERO FIVE PD I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ALL YOU SAY CMA WHICH FINTIRELY MEETS MY DIFFICULTIES PD WE SHALL AGREE THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICE FORTHWITH SUBJECT TO CLEARING MATTER FINALLY WITH DOMINIONS TO DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE NEED OF FORMAL INTERCHANGE OF LETTERS PD OF COURSE WHEN I AM ASKED I SHALL STATE MY VIEW OF THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT FROM MY OWN STANDPOINT IN TERMS WHICH WILL LIE WITHIN YOUR ASSURANCES PD I DO NOT INTEND TO QUOTE YOU PD PARA TWO RE YOUR ONE ZERO THREE PD I AM VERY GLAD YOU HAVE DONE THIS PD PARA THREE PD I AM TELLING CHIANG THAT WE SHOULD LIKE HIM TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE LONDON PACIFIC COUNCIL CMA OF COURSE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO HIS CONTRACTS WITH WASHINGTON PD I HAVE HAD A TELEGRAM FROM DILL SUGGESTING OUR SENDING PUBLIC MESSAGES TO CHIANG CMA WHICH SEEM TO HAVE A NOTE OF APPEAL IN THEM PD I THINK IT BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL WE GET THROUGH OUR IMMEDIATE MISFORTUNES BEFORE SENDING SUCH MESSAGES PD I DO NOT GATHER THAT YOU HAVE YET BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THIS PD PARA FOUR PD SCHARNHORST AND GNEISENAU ARE BEATING THEIR WAY UP CHANNEL AND HAVE RUN THE BATTERIES AT DOVER PD WE ARE OUT

AFTER THEM WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE PD PARA FIVE PD A FIERCE

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Ву R. H. Разреде-гато при при мес со по папа пака п

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

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From

Copies furnished as noted:

#6 FROM LONDON -2-

To_

BATTLE IS RAGING AT SINGAPORE AND ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN
TO FIGHT IT OUT PD PARA SIX PD I AM HOLDING UP ANNOUNCEMENT
AIR MARSHALL PEIRSE CMA AND EQUALLY HARRIS PD FORMER NAVAL
PERSON

PRIME

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Govt., State Dapt. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972



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FEBRUARY 16, 1942

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
LONDON From

> POTUS To_{-}

Copies furnished as noted:

NO 7 FEBRUARY 16

TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND SECRET PARA ONE PD . WAVELL WIRE THAT HE WOULD LIKE AN AMERICAN ADMIRAL TO BE APPOINTED AS DEPUTY TO HELFRICH BUT THAT HE WANTS TO KEEP PALLISER PAREN BRITISH PAREN AS CHIEF ASSISTANT PD HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT PALLISER SHOULD NOT BE REPLACED AT THE PRESENT CRISIS PD PARA TWO PD YOU WILL HAVE SEEN WAVELLS TELEGRAMS ABOUT NEW SITUATION CREATED BY FALL OF SINGAPORE AND JAPANESE STRONG LANDINGS IN SUMATRA PD WE ARE CONSIDERING NEW POSITION TONIGHT ON THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE AND TOMORROW ON THE PACIFIC COUNCIL CMA AND WILL SEND YOU OUR RECOMMENDAT-PD UNLESS THERE IS GOOD PROSPECT OF EFFECTIVE LONS RESISTANCE IN SUMATRA AND JAVA CMA THE ISSUE ARISES WHETHER ALL REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE DIVERED TO RANGOON AND AUSTRALIA PD THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SEEM INCLINED TO PRESS FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR TWO DIVISIONS TO AUSTRALIA PD I COULD NOT RESIST THEM FOR LONG CMA AND PROBABLY THEIR THIRD DIVISION PD (CMA?) NOW IN PALESTINE CMA WILL FOLLOW PD IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE MOST VITAL POINT AT THE MOMENT IS RANGOON CMA ALONE



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веричен-мер.-листия высе воок со...не..нымаль Вра. М. Н. Рагка

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From


To:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date

Copies furnished as noted:

NO 7 FEBRUARY 16 PAGE 2 5 1972

ASSURING CONTRACT WITH CHINA PD AS YOU SEE CMA WAVELL HAS VERY RIGHTLY ALREADY DIVERTED OUR ARMOURED BRIGADE CMA WHICH SHOULD REACH THERE ON THE TWENTIETH INSTANT PD THE CHIEFS OF THE STAFF WILL SEND YOU THE RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW THROUGH THE MILITARY CHANNEL PD PARA THREE PD A BATTLE IS IMPENDING IN LIBYA IN WHICH ROMMEL WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE OFFENSIVE PD WE HOPE TO GIVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF OURSELVES PD PRELIMINARY AIR FIGHTING YESTERDAY WAS VERY GOOD PD PARA FOUR PD THE NAVAL POSITION IN HOME WATERS AND ATLANTIC HAS BEEN DEFINITELY EASED BY THE RETREAT THE OF THE GERMAN NAVAL FORCES FROM BREST PD FROM THERE THEY THREATENED ALL OUR EAST DASH BOUND CONVOYS CMA ENFORCING TWO BATTLE DASH SHIPS ESCORT PD THEIR SQUADRONS COULD ALSO MOVE EITHER ON TO THE ATLANTIC TRADE ROUTES OR INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN WE WOULD FAR RATHER HAVE IT WHERE IT IS THAN WHERE IT WAS PD OUR BOMBER EFFORT INSTEAD OF BEING DISPERSED CAN NOW BE CONCENTRATED ON GERMANY PD LASTLY CMA AS YOU MAY HAVE LEARNT FROM MOST SECRET SOURCES CMA PRINZ EUGEN WAS DAMAGED AND BOTH SCHARNHORST AND ATSIFORM-PRID,-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., MIASARA FALLS, R. T.



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Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Grant Street,				-
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			THE REAL PROPERTY.	40000000
			Section 2	Section 1
DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	3600000	10000	-	

M.

From_

To_

Copies furnished as noted:

NO 7 FEBRUARY 16 PAGE 3

GNEISENAU WERE MINED CMA THE FORMER TWICE PD THIS
WILL KEEP THEM OUT OF MISCHIEF FOR AT LEAST SIX
MONTHS CMA DURING WHICH BOTH OUR NAVIES WILL RECEIVE
IMPORTANT ACCESSIONS OF STRENGTH PD NATURALLY WE
WERE VERY SORRY WE DID NOT SINK THEM CMA AND AN
INQUIRY IS BEING HELD AS TO WHY WE DID NOT KNOW AT
DAYLIGHT THEY WERE OUT PD NUMBER TWENTY NINE SIGNED
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

X PRIME



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MAY 5 1972

AC-4


DI 25 940P

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19, 1942.

From LONDON,

To THE PRESIDENT.



Copies furnished as noted:

LONDON NO. 8. FEBRUARY 19TH.

PERSONAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT PARA THE PRIME MINISTER JUST HANDED ME A LIST OF THE NEW W AR CABINET PD THESE SEVEN NAMES WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS FOR RELEASE TOMORROW MORNING PD THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CON TINUE AS MINISTER OF DEFENCE PD ATTLEE WILL BE DESIGNATED A S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND WILL ALSO BE NAMED MINISTER FOR THE DOMINIONS PD EDEN FOREIGN SECRETARY CMA SIR STAFFORD CR IPPS LOND PRIVY SEAL AND LEADER OF THE HOUSE PD LYTTLETON W ILL BE RECALLED FROM EGYPT AS MINISTER OF STATES WITH THE J OB OF COORDINATING PRODUCTION PD BEVIN MINISTER OF LABOR AN D NATIONAL SERVICE AND SIR JOHN ANDERSON LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL PD PARA BEAVERBROOK AND GREENWOOD WILL DROP OUT OF THE WAR CABINET CMA THE FORMER ON GROUNDS OF HEALTH PD THE WHITE PAPER ARRANGEMENT REGARDING THE MINISTRY OF PRODU CTION WILL BE DROPPED PD SIR KINGSLEY WOOD WILL CONTINUE AS CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCCHEQUER BUT NOT AS A MEMBER OF THE WA R CABINET PD MOYNE LEAVES THE CABINET PD



DECLASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RHIB Date 2/11/72

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From____

All M.

SHEET #2 OF LONDON NO. 8-19TH.

Copies furnished as noted:

CRANBORNE IS TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLO NIES PD I WAS TOLD CONFIDENTIALLY THAT A CHANGE IS CONTEMPL ATED IN THE WAR OFFICE PD IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT BEAVE RBROOK WILL BE ASSIGNED TO DO SPECIAL MISSIONS PD THE LATTE R HAS SO HARRIED THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT I WILL NOT BE SORRY TO SEE HIM OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE TIME BEING PD BRINGING CRIPPS INT O THE GÖVERNMENT WILL SATISFY PRO RUSSIAN SYMPATHIES PD THE CHANGES WHOULD STRENGTHEN LABOR SUPPORT AND ALSO PERMIT GR EATER TEAMWORK WITHIN THE WAR CABINET PD BEVIN AND BEAVERBR OOK WERE ALWAYS AT SWORDS POINTS PD PARA THE REALIGNMENT SH OULD BE MORE FRIENDLY RATHER THAN LESS FRIENDLY TO THE UNIT ED STATES AND SHOULD GIVE GREATER SUPPORT TO OUR GENERAL PE ACE AIMS PD PARA ALTHOUGH AMERY CONTINUES AS SECRETARY OF S TATE FOR INDIA I AM TOLD THAT THERE WILL BE AN EFFORT TO RE CONSIDER INDIAN POLICY PD PARA THE PRIME MINISTER WAS DELIG HTED WITH YOUR MESSAGE PD PD I HAVE JUST RETUNED FROM VISIT ING OUR TROOPS WITH GENERAL CHANEY PD THEY WERE WELL AND IN GOOD SPIRITS PD PARA I AM USING YOUR SPECIAL WIRE TO TRANS DECLASSIFIED MIT THIS INFORMATION. State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

WINANT.

By RHCks Dato 2/11/72

Action Copy



FEBRUARY 19, 1942

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR MR. HOPKINS.

THE DUTCH WANT ME TO SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING FOR OUR FRIEND.

REFERENCE TELEGRAM COS(W) 60 WHICH WE SENT YESTERDAY TO

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR PROPOSED DRAFT

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL WAVELL, WHICH CAME TO US AS JSM NO. 47 WITH

NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER.

- (2) DUTCH GOVERNMENT ARE VERY ANXIOUS THAT PARAGRAPH 1 OF INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL WAVELL SHOULD FOLLOW AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WORDING OF RESOLUTION OF PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL. THE REASON IS THAT YOUR DRAFT MIGHT GIVE IMPRESSION OF LACK OF DETERMINATION TO FIGHT IT OUT IN JAVA.
- (3) SUGGEST ORIGINAL WORDING SHOULD STAND WITH ADDITION OF FOLLOWING:

"YOU HAVE DISCRETION AS TO PRECISE WAY IN WHICH THIS INSTRUCTION IS IMPLEMENTED."

(4) REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR DRAFT, PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL
HAD VERY MUCH HOPED THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEND NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS TO ABDA AREA. NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT ARE THEREFORE EXTREMELY
DISAPPOINTED THAT NO SUCH REINFORCEMENTS APPEAR TO BE CONTEMPLATED.
THEY EARNESTLY REQUEST ME TO ASK YOU TO RECONSIDER THIS MATTER.

RECEASED UNCLASSIFIED by British

Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. E. Parks Date MAY 5 1972



MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ABDACOM

FROM: Combined Chiefs of Staff

Dated: 19th February, 1942

.D.B.A. 18

Reference your personal 01288/16 and C.C.O.S. 7 and 8.

- JAVA should be defended with the utmost resolution by all forces at present in the Island. Every day gained is of importance.
- You have discretion to augment defence of Java with available naval forces and with U.S. aircraft now at your disposal assembling in Australia.
- 3. Land reinforcements now on the way from the West should not repeat now proceed to Java, but should augment defense of points in your area vital to the continuance of struggle against Japan, namely, Burma and Australia.
- 4. Consent of Australian Government is being sought to despatch of 7th Australian Division to Burma to assist in defence of that country until relieved by other forces from the West.
- 6th and 9th Australian Divisions will be moved to Australia from Middle East as rapidly as possible.
- Combined U.S. naval and air operations are now under way on Japanese flank in area immediately east of New Guinea.

T.O.O. 22090/18

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

Lication Branch 19 June 1972

CABLE				
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Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

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FEBRUARY 19, 1942

901P M.

From LONDON

To POTUS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

Copies furnished as noted:

#30 NUMBER

NUMBER #. FEBRUARY 20TH:

Date MAY 5 1972

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT NUMBER THIRTY PERSO NAL AND SECRET PARA ONE I AM MOST DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FO R YOUR WARM HEARTED TELEGRAM NUMBER ONE HUNDRED SIX PD THE PRESSURE HERE HAS NEVER BEEN DANGEROUS AND I HAVE USED IT T O EFFECT WHOLESOME CHANGES AND ACCESSIONS PD YOU MAY TAKE I T EVERYTHING IS NOW SOLID PD PARA TWO I AM GRIEVED ABOUT MA X CMA BUT HE REALLY DOES NEED TWO OR THREE MONTHS IN SUNSHI NE FOR HIS ASTHMA AND I KNOW YOU WILL REALIZE WHAT FRIENDS WE ARE AND HOW HELPFUL : HIS DRIVING POWER WILL BE WHEN HE H AS RECOVERED HIS HEALTH PARA THREE I DO NOT LIKE THESE DAYS OF PERSONAL STRESS AND I HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO KEEP M Y EYE ON THE BALL PD WE ARE HOWEVER IN THE FULLEST ACCORD I N ALL MAIN THINGS CMA AND I WILL TELEPRINT YOU MORE AT LARG E OVER THE WEEKEND PD DEMOCRACY HAS TO PROVE THAT IT CAN PR OVIDE A GRANITE FOUNDATION FOR WAR AGAINST TYRANNY PD I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR RUBBING IT IN ABOUT THE EASEMENT IN THE ATLANTIC BY THE GERMAN FLIGHT FROM BREST CMA BUT OF CO URSE WE CANNOT DWELL TOO MUCH UPON THE DAMAGE THEY SUSTAINE D PD EVERY GOOD WISH AND VERY MANY THANKS SIGNED WINSTON CH

URCHILL

PRIME

Action Copy

REDIFFER-PATE -AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NINGARA FALLE, B.



FILED 20/749F

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 20 1942

M.

LONDON From

> POTUS To_



Copies furnished as noted:

#31

NO. XXXXC 10 FEBRUARY 20TH

TO PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON NUMBER THIRTY ONE MOST IMMEDIATE PD PARA THE ONLY TROOPS WHO CAN REACH RANGOON IN TIME TO STOP THE ENEMY AND ENABLE OTHER REINFORC EMENTS TO ARRIVE ARE THE LEADING AUSTRALIAN DIVISION PD THESE CAN BEGIN TO ARRIVE THERE BY TWENTYSIXTH OR TWENTY SEVENTH PD WE HAVE ASKED AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THIS DIVERSION FOR THE NEEDS OF BATTLE CMA AND PRONTSED TO RELIEVE THEM AT EARLIEST PD ALL OTHER AUSTRALIAN TROOPS GOING HOME AT EARLIEST PD AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE RE-FUSED POINT BLANK PD I HAVE APPEALED TO THEM AGAIN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING OPEN BURMA ROAD AND MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH CHIANG PD PARA TWO IN VIEW OF YOUR OFFER OF AMERICAN TROOPS TO HELP DEFEND AUSTRALIA AND POSSIBLE NAVAL MOVEMENTS I FEEL YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO PRESS FOR THIS MOVEMENT OF ALLIED FORCES PD PLEASE THEREFORE SEND ME A MESSAGE WHICH I CAN ADD TO THE VERY STRONG CABLE I HAVE JUST SENT OFF PD OUR CHIEFS OF STAFFS HERE ARE MOST INSISTENT AND I HAVE NO DOUBT OUR' COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON FEEL THE SAME WAY PD THERE IS NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD NOT

PRIME REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British

FEBRUARY 20, 1942

TO: AMEMBASSY, LONDON FOR: CHURCHILL

FROM: HOPKINS

HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE WITH PRESIDENT.

SECTION ONE HAS BEEN REDRAFTED AND HAS BEEN SENT TO WAVELL

BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

"JAVA SHOULD BE DEFENDED WITH THE UTMOST RESOLUTION BY ALL
FORCES AT PRESENT IN THE ISLAND. EVERY DAY GAINED IS OF
IMPORTANCE. THERE SHOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS OR AIR
FORCES OF ANY NATIONALITY AND NO SURRENDER. AMENDMENTS TO THESE
INSTRUCTIONS CAUSED BY EMERGENCY CHANGES IN SITUATION SHOULD BE
REFERRED TO WASHINGTON AND IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE WILL BE
DECIDED BY YOU ON THE SPOT."

PRESIDENT WILL CABLE YOU DIRECT LATER TODAY RELATIVE TO NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

MOST IMMEDIATE



To: ABDA Com

Chiefs of Staff, London Combined Chiefs of Staff

No:

Reptd:

From:

D.B.A. 20

1. Your own headquarters will be withdrawn in such a manner, at such time and to such a place within or without the ABDA Area as you may decide, but its timely withdrawal is important. Dutch should be allowed to decide which of their representatives with your Headquarters should leave or stay and also destrination of any personnel withdrawn.

- Amplification of instructions contained in paragraph 1 of D.B.A. 19 will follow. In meantime Dutch shipping should be held and used accordingly.
- When you withdraw report to whom you have transferred Command of JAVA.
- 4. Future ABDA Area now being considered by Combined Chiefs of Staff.
 - Acknowledge.
 - Our D.B.A. 18 was not used.


T.O.O. 1651Q/21.

21 February 1942

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS

927/495-1 3/28/22

By RHCR Date APR 4 1972



To: Chiefs of Staff, London

Joint Staff Mission, Washington

21 February 1942

No:

From:

J.S.M. 58

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff.


- PRESIDENT agrees to following message which was originally proposed as paragraph 1 of D.B.A. 20. To save time request you despatch most immediate to ABDACOM as D.B.A. 22 repeating here if Prime Minister concurs.
- 2. "Reference paragraph 2 of D.B.A. 20. All men of fighting units for whom there are arms must continue to fight without thought of evacuation, but air forces which can more usefully operate in battle from bases outside Java and all air personnel for whom there are no aircraft and such troops as cannot contribute to defence of Java should be withdrawn. With respect to personnel who cannot contribute to defence, general policy should be to withdraw U.S. and Australian personnel to Australia."

T.O.O. 1655Q/21

By Authority of CS

927/495-1 3/28/22

By RHER Date APR 4 1972



22 February 1942

To: ABDA Com.

Reptd: Chiefs of Staff, London

From: Combined Chiefs of Staff

No: D.B.A. 22

Reference paragraph 2 of D.B.A. 20. All men of fighting units for whom there are arms must continue to fight without thought of evacuation, but air forces which can more usefully operate in battle from bases outside Java and all air personnel for whom there are no aircraft and such troops particularly technicians as cannot contribute to defence of Java, should be withdrawn. With respect to personnel who cannot contribute to defence, general policy should be to withdraw U.S. and Australian personnel to Australia.

T.O.O. 0059Q/22

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CS

927/495-1 3/28/22

By Reference Date APR 4 1972

FEBRUARY 23, 1942

2185

NOTE: The following statement is for release to editions of all newspapers appearing on the streets NOT EARLIER THAN 8:00 A.M., E.W.T., Tuesday, February 24, 1942. The same release also applies to radio announcers and news commentators.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

STEPHEN EARLY Secretary to the President

An agreement between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on the principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war was signed yesterday (Monday) by the Acting Secretary of State and the British Ambassador.

The agreement is made under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941. By this Act of the Congress and the great appropriations by which it has been supported this mation is able to provide arms, equipment, and supplies to any country whose defense is vital to our own defense.

On December 7, 1941, we were attacked. We are now one of the twenty-six United Nations devoting all of their united strength to the winning of this war and to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The vast resources which Providence has given us enable us to insure that our comrades in arms shall not lack arms. Congress has granted the authority and the means. United and equipped by the overwhelming productive power of their resources and ours, we shall fight together to the final victory.

Recent developments in the war have shown, if proof was required, the wisdom and necessity of the policy of lend-lease supplies to the United Nations. That policy continues, and is expanding to meet the expanding needs of the fighting fronts. The agreement signed yesterday reaffirms our purpose to supply aid to Great Britain. The British Government will supply this country with such reciprocal aid as it is in a position to give.

As to the terms of settlement between the two countries, the agreement states that it is too early in this struggle to foresee or define the precise and detailed terms. Instead the agreement lays down certain of the principles which are to prevail. These principles are broadly conceived, for the scale of aid is so vast that narrow conceptions of the terms of settlement would be as disastrous to our economy and to the welfare of our people as to the welfare of the British people. Articles which at the end of the war can be returned to us, and which we wish to have back, will be returned. Full account will be taken of all reciprocal aid.

The fundamental framework of the final settlement which shall be sought on the economic side is given in Article VII. It shall be a settlement by agreement open to participation by all other nations of like mind. Its purpose shall be not to burden but to improve worldwide economic relations. Its aims will be to provide appropriate national and international measures to expand

production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which, the agreement states; are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples, to eliminate all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers, and, generally, to attain the economic objectives of the Atlantic Charter.

To that end Article VII provides for the early commencement of conversations, within the framework which it outlines, with a view to establishing now the foundations upon which we may create after the war a system of enlarged production, exchange, and consumption of goods for the satisfaction of human needs in our country, in the British Commonwealth, and in all other countries which are willing to join in this great effort. Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Authorized and Provided for by the Act of March 11, 1941.

Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United Ltates of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfil or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to betrene-ferred or provided.

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III

-2-

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, upon to participation

by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this 23rd day of February, 1942.

AMDI 7 332PM/24

But

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 24, 1942

10:41 AM.

From_

AMEMBASSY LONDON

To_

POTUS WASHINGTON

Copies furnished as noted:



NO XXXC 11 FEBRUARY 24TH

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMRE NAVAL
PERSON NUMBER THIRTY TWO PARA WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS
ON YOUR HEARTENING DECLARATION

PRIME



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972 AMDI 1 1225PM/27 CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 27, 1942

7:56 PM.

From USG AMEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON



Copies furnished as noted:

NO XXXC 12 FEBRUARY 27TH

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMAL NAVAL PERSON NUMBER THIRTY THREE PCRA UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION PD I BELIEVE THAT A NUMBER OF FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS CMA ORGANIZATIONS CMA OR GROUPS HAVE RECENTLY TOLD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CMA AND IN SOME CASES THEY HAVE TOLD US AS WELL CMA OF THEIR WISH TO ACCEDE TO THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION AS QUOTE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES UNQUOTE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON JANUARY SIXTH YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT THIS STATEMENT WAS DEVISED FOR THE FREE FRENCH PD APPLICATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED CMA AMONG OTHERS CMA FROM OTTO STRASSERS FREE GERMAN MOVEMENT CMA THE BASQUE AND CATALAN EMIGRE MOVEMENTS CMA KING ZOG AND THE LATVIAN MINISTER MINISTER AT WASHINGTON PD HALIFAX HAS TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF STATEMENTS OF ACCESSION BY THESE GROUPS WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO US AND I UNDER-STAND THAT THERE IS NOT IN FACT ANY QUESTION OF SUCH ACCESSIONS BEING ACCEPTED PD WE MAY CMA HOWEVER CMA SHORTLY HAVE TO CONSIDER APPROACHES FROM MORE WELCOME

Grewered by Pres # 112.
Action Copy

Govt., State Dept. tel., 129-735 1972

REDIFORM-PATE .- AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NINGARA FALLS, N. V.

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

 $_{M}$.

From USG AMEMBASSY LONDON

To____POTUS WASHINGTON



Copies furnished as noted:

- PAGE 2 -

CANDIDATES SUCH AS PERSIA AND ETHIOPIA AND POSSIBLY
IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS THE FREE FRENCH PD
MY FEELING IS THAT IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE COUNTRY
DESIRING TO JOIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE BUT THAT WE
SHOULD WELCOME ADHERENCE OF THESE PARTICULAR COUNTRIES
PD I AM MOST ANXIOUS THAT YOU AND WE SHOULD KEEP IN
STEP AND THAT NO ACCESSION SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT
PREVIOUS CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO OF US PD AS I
UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE DEALING PERSONALLY WITH THIS
QUESTION CMA I PUT MY VIEWS DIRECTLY TO YOU PD EACH
PARTICULAR CASE WHICH ARISES CAN OF COURSE BE DISCUSSED
THROUGH THE USUAL CHANNELS

PRIME



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By B. H. Parks DateMAY 5 1972

Action Copy

REDIFORM-PATO,-ANERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., MIALARA PALLE, N. T.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

March 1, 1942

Short her files

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made of me on Friday, I am enclosing herewith a suggested message for you to send to Mr. Churchill in response to his message to you of February 27.

I am returning to you herewith Mr. Churchill's message, as you requested.

Believe me

faithfully yours,

Enc.

LN

The President,

The White House.



State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 By MAR 1 1972 PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect | Full rate | Day letter | Night letter

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Charge Department: XX

Department of State

Full rate Day letter Night letter

DECLASSIFIED

Washington,

Charge to

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

March 4, 1942

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 1 4 1972

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON.

No 1/2 FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

The views outlined in your telegram on the adherences to the United Nations declaration very closely coincide with mine.

I believe we should without question accept the adherence of the French National Committee in London, whenever submitted, but that we should consult as to the action to be taken on requests for further adherences from governments with which we are still in official communication.

We might then determine at what moment we should bring the Soviet Government, and other governments of the United Nations which may be directly concerned, into these consultations.

As for "free groups " representing the populations of occupied countries, and other organizations, I have no intention of taking any action without full consultation

Enciphered by	
Sent by operator M.,	, 19,

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect | Full rate | Day letter | Night letter

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Charge Department:

Full rate Day letter Night letter

Charge to

Department of State

TELEGRAM SENT

Washington,

-2-

with you.

Welles had already commenced the discussion of this general problem with Halifax prior to the receipt of your message, and he will continue these conversations along the lines above indicated. Rureush


Acting

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the W.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 14 1972

Eu:RA:TMT PA/D:JCD U:SW:GES



THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON

March 7, 1942.



MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Attached are 3 copies of revised draft of message from the President to the Prime Minister.

Will you please give one copy to Mr. Hopkins and keep one for your file. Please, also, when the message is finally sent, send me a copy for distribution to the Chiefs of Staff.

M. B. S.

Incl. Draft of message.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of 905 927/495-1

22 Feb: 1972

By MAR 1 1972



JCS 927/495-1 225-1975

By RAPRS Date MAR 1197

7 March 1942

DECLASSIFIED

TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

No. 113 1. We have been in constant conference since receipt of your message of March 4th to insure that nothing is left unexplored which can in any way improve our present prospects. We recognize fully the magnitude of the problems confronting you in the Indian Ocean and are equally concerned over those which confront us in the Pacific, particularly since the United States assumes a heavy responsibility regarding measures for the defense of Australia, New Zealand, and the guarding of their sea approaches. You, on the other hand, will recognize the difficulties under which we labor in deploying and maintaining, in unprepared and distant positions, the considerable forces which will be required to meet this critical situation. I know that you will also appreciate that success in holding this region depends largely upon the adequacy of shipping, and the availability of munitions and aircraft for arming Dominion forces. The magnitude of the effort which may be put forth by the U.S. in the Southwest Pacific has a direct relation to the magnitude of the air offensive which the U.S. will be able to undertake from United Kingdom Bases.

- 2. The U.S. is now operating a large part of the Pacific Fleet in the Anzac region, for the defense of Australia and New Zealand, for preserving a base area for a future decisive offensive against Japan, and for containing Japanese naval and air forces in the Pacific. Provided their bases in the west of Australia can be kept secure, U.S. submarines will continue to operate in the ABDA Area against Japanese supply lines and against naval forces that exit to the Indian Ocean
- 3. While Japan is indeed extending herself over a large area, it must be admitted that the deployment has been skilfully executed and continues to be effective. The energy of the Japanese attack is still very powerful. It is only through a greater energy, skill, and determination, that Japan can be halted before

she attains a dominating position from which it would prove most difficult to eject her. The U.S. agrees that the Pacific situation is now very grave, and, if it is to be stabilized, requires an immediate, concerted, and vigorous effort by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. To establish the many defended bases now planned and to transport to them their garrisons, together with enough amphibious troops for even minor offensives, requires the movement there of some of our amphibious forces, and the use of all our combat loaded transports which are not urgently needed at home for elementary training of additional amphibious formations. The loan to the British of transports for further troop movements to Indian requires the use of combat transports for carrying U.S. garrisons to positions in the Pacific, and thus, seriously reduces present possibilities of offensive action in other regions.

4. We concur in your estimate of the importance of the Indian and Middle East Areas and agree that reinforcements are required. We also agree that the Australian and New Zealand divisions now in that region should remain. The 41st Division is leaving the United States by the 18th of this month, reaching Australia about April 10th. As a replacement for Australian and New Zealand divisions allotted to the Middle Hast and India, the United States is prepared to dispatch two additional divisions:one to Australia and one to New Zealand. A convoy of one-half a division could leave about April 15th and the remainder of this division about May 15th. Another U.S. division can also leave for the Southwest Pacific about May 15th. It should be understood that our willingness to dispatch these two divisions, over and above the 41st, which is already set up to go, is based on the necessity for economizing in shipping and the continuing security of the Middle East, India and Ceylon. It is, therefore, dependent upon the retention of a similar number of Australian and New Zealand divisions in those theaters. The above movements in

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the Southwest Pacific can be accomplished provided that some twentyfive cargo ships are withdrawn for one voyage from those engaged in transport of Lend-Lease material to the Red Sea and to China, and scheduled to sail in April and May. 5. The U.S. can furnish shipping to move 2 divisions (40,000 men) with their equipment from the U.K. to the Middle East and India. The first convoy consisting of all the U.S. ahipping and the Aquitania can depart for U.K. about April 26 and the remainder about May 6. The supplying of these ships is continguent upon acceptance of the following during the period they are so used: a. Cymnast cannot be undertaken. b. Movements of U.S. troops to the British Isles will be limited to those which these ships can take from the U.S. c. Direct Movements to Iceland (C) cannot be made. d. Meven cargo ships must be withdrawn from sallings for Burma and Red Son during April and May. These ships are engaged in transportation of Lond-Lease material to China and the Middle East. e. American contribution to an air offensive against Germany in 1942 would be somewhat curtailed and any American contribution to land operations on the continent of Europe in 1942 will be materially reduced. It is considered essential that the U.S. ships used for the movement of the two British Divisions be returned to U.S. upon completion of the movement. . 6. In addition to considerable U.S. air, antisircraft and auxiliary troops, there is now in Australia one division, intended for defense of New Caledonia, which contributes directly to Australian security. As stated above, the 41st Division is scheduled to sail to Australia on March 18th. With the arrival

of this division, U.S. ground and air forces in Australia and New Caledonia will total some 90,000 men.

Samoa has been garrisoned and a U.S. pursuit squadron has been sent to Suva. With the line from Samoa to Australia held, New Zealand in its retired position south thereof, is not thought to be in danger of serious attack.

PERSONNEL SHIPPING

7. The present shipbuilding program seems to be about the maximum that can be attained, and any increases would not be available until after June, 1944. Included in the program are thirty C-4 ships, each having a lift of 3,675 men, and twenty P-2 ships, each having a lift of 5,750 men. Thus, under construction we now have troopships that will carry 225,250 men. It is understood that the British do not plan to increase their total of troop-carrying ships.

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a. Alaska, Army one group (thirty-five) heavy bombers heavy bombers and one group (eighty) pursuit, Navy 48 VPB. b. Hawaii and North Pacific Islands, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers three groups plus two squadrons (290) pursuit, one squadron (13) light bombers, Navy 126 VPB 48 VSO 90 VF, 90 VSB. c. Southwest Pacific and Australia, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers, two groups medium bombers (114), one group light bombers (57), five groups and one squadron (425), pursuit, Navy 90 VPB, 24 VSO, 81 VSB, 81 VF. d. Caribbean area, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers one group (57) medium bombers one group (57) light bombers four groups (320) pursuit, Navy (108) VPB 60 VSO. e. China-India-Burma area, Army one group plus two squadrons heavy bombers (60) one group pursuit (80) exclusive of AVG. f. Outposts on lines of communications, Army one squadron heavy bombers (8) two squadrons medium bombers (26) seven squadrons pursuit (175), Navy 48 VPB 12 VSO. Army Air Forces available for offensive against. Gormany: (1) July 1942, three groups heavy bombers (105) one group medium bombers (57) three groups light bombers (171) five groups pursuits (400). (2) October 1942, eleven groups heavy bombers (385) three groups medium bombers (171) five groups light bombers (285) seven groups pursuit# (560). (3) January 1943, fifteen groups heavy bombers (525) seven groups medium bombers (399) seven groups light bombers (399) thirteen groups pursuits (1040). *Pursuit to be used as fighter escort for daylight bombing and for offensive sweeps.

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TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

7 March 1942

No 1/3 1. We have been in constant conference since receipt of your message of March 4th to insure that nothing is left unexplored which can in any way improve our present prospects. We recognize fully the magnitude of the problems confronting you in the Indian Ocean and are equally concerned over those which confront us in the Pacific, particularly since the United States assumes a heavy responsibility regarding measures for the defense of Australia, New Zealand, and the guarding of their sea approaches. You, on the other hand, will recognize the difficulties under which we labor in deploying and maintaining, in unprepared and distant positions, the considerable forces which will be required to meet this critical situation. I know that you will also appreciate that success in holding this region depends largely upon the adequacy of shipping, and the availability of munitions and aircraft for arming Dominion The magnitude of the effort which may be put forth by the forces. U.S. in the Southwest Pacific has a direct relation to the magnitude of the air offensive which the U.S. will be able to undertake from United Kingdom Bases.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.S. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

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10. In confiding thus fully and personally to you the details of our military arrangements I do not mean that they should be with-held from your close military advisors. I request, however, that further circulation be drastically reduced.

- 11. I am sending you a personal suggestion on Sunday in regard to simplification of area responsibilities.
- 12. This may be a critical period but remember always it is not as bad as some you have so well survived before.

ROOSEVELT



WASHINGTON

March 9, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON

#/14 I have decided, if it is agreeable to you, to send to you in London, as my representative on naval matters, the present Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, as the successor at Admiral Chormley who has been serving as Special Naval Observer in London. Stark has, as you know, broad knowledge of our Naval Forcess afloat and ashore, and I think he will definitely contribute to the work of the Combined Staff in London.

I am putting Admiral King into Stark's place here as Chief of Naval Operations, but King will also retain the position of Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and will remain in Washington.

Insured by Prime Minister's # 43, 10 Mar 42.

of the U.S No. 115

By W.P. Howart

March 9, 1942.

TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

I TELEGRAPHED YOU SATURDAY NIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMBINED STAFFS AS YOU DOUBTLESS RECOGNIZED FROM THE CONTEXT. I WANT TO SEND YOU THIS PURELY PERSONAL VIEW SO THAT YOU MAY KNOW HOW MY THOUGHTS ARE DEVELOPING RELATIVE TO ORGANIZATION.

I AM CONCERNED BY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESENT OPERATIONAL COMMAND SETUP TO WHICH IS ADDED EQUAL COMPLEXITY IN THE POLITICAL SETUP.

WHEN ALL IS CONSIDERED THE OVERWHELMING CONTRIBUTION
OF ALL THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RUSSIA, AND TO
LESSER EXTENT CHINA, COMES AND WILL INCREASINGLY COME FROM THE
RESOURCES OF BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. EVER SINCE OUR JANUARY
MEETINGS THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS OF THAT PERIOD HAVE LARGELY
BECOME OBSOLESCENT IN RELATION TO THE WHOLE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

I WISH THEREFORE THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL SIMPLIFICATION.

AREA WILL REST ON THE UNITED STATES. THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR OPERATING DECISIONS FOR THE AREA AS A WHOLE WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THERE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS WITH MEMBERS FROM AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND CHINA WITH AN AMERICAN PRESIDING. CANADA COULD BE ADDED. THE PACIFIC COUNCIL NOW SITTING IN LONDON MIGHT WELL BE MOVED HERE; AT ANY RATE THE OPERATIONAL FACT OF ITS FUNCTIONS INCLUDING SUPPLY SHOULD OPERATE FROM HERE.



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Date OCH 1977

YOU MAY THINK IT BEST TO HAVE A PACIFIC COUNCIL IN LONDON CONSIDERING POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

THE SUPREME COMMAND IN THIS AREA WILL BE AMERICAN.

LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND ON THE CONTINENT OF AUSTRALIA WILL BE
IN CHARGE OF AN AUSTRALIAN. LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND IN NEW
ZEALAND WILL BE UNDER A NEW ZEALANDER. LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND
IN CHINA WILL BE UNDER THE GENERALISSIMO. LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND
IN DUTCH INDIES WOULD BE GIVEN TO A DUTCHMAN IF LATER ON AN
OFFENSIVE CAN REGAIN THAT AREA FROM THE JAPANESE.

UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT DECISIONS FOR IMMEDIATE

OPERATING STRATEGY WOULD BE DETERMINED IN WASHINGTON AND BY

AMERICAN SUPREME COMMANDER FOR WHOLE PACIFIC AREA UNDER SUPERVISION

OF UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE METHODS OF REGAINING THE

OFFENSIVE WOULD BE SIMILARLY DECIDED. THIS WOULD INCLUDE FOR

EXAMPLE OFFENSIVES IN NORTHWESTERLY DIRECTION FROM THE MAIN, BASES

AND ATTACKS ON JAPAN PROPER FROM CHINESE OR ALEUTIAN OR SIBERIAN

BASES. THERE WOULD BE DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITY ON OUR PART THUS

RELIEVING BRITISH FROM ANY TASKS IN THIS AREA OTHER THAN SUPPLEMENTING OUR EFFORTS WITH MATERIAL WHERE POSSIBLE.

(2) THE MIDDLE AREA EXTENDING FROM SINGAPORE TO AND INCLUDING INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, PERSIAN GULF, RED SEA, LIBYA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WOULD FALL DIRECTLY UNDER BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.

ALL OPERATIONAL MATTERS IN THIS AREA WOULD BE DECIDED BY YOU. BUT ALWAYS WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT AS MUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN TO INDIA OR NEAR EAST BY AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AS COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE


TO IT ALL POSSIBLE MUNITIONS AND VESSEL ASSIGNMENTS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PRESUPPOSES THE TEMPORARY SHELVING OF GYMNAST.

WATERS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE
DEFINITE PLANS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW FRONT ON THE EUROPEAN
CONTINENT. THIS WOULD BE THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES. DETAILS OF COMMAND TO BE WORKED OUT AS
REQUIRED. I AM BECOMING MORE AND MORE INTERESTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS NEW FRONT THIS SUMMER, CERTAINLY FOR AIR AND RAIDS.
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SHIPPING AND SUPPLIES IT IS INFINITELY
EASIER FOR US TO PARTICIPATE IN BECAUSE OF A MAXIMUM DISTANCE
OF ABOUT THREE THOUSAND MILES. AND EVEN THOUGH LOSSES WILL
DOUBTLESS BE GREAT, SUCH LOSSES WILL BE COMPENSATED BY AT LEAST
EQUAL GERMAN LOSSES AND BY COMPELLING GERMANS TO DIVERT LARGE
FORCES OF ALL KINDS FROM RUSSIAN FRONTS.

FURTHERMORE UNDER THIS PLAN ICELAND AND MAGNET BECOME OF LESS IMPORTANCE BECAUSE OF OFFENSIVE CONDUCTED AGAINST ENEMY ON EUROPEAN SOIL ITSELF.

(4) IT IS INTENDED OF COURSE TO CARRY THROUGH ALL POSSIBLE AID TO RUSSIA.

IN REGARD TO THE SECOND PROPOSED AREA UNDER BRITISH CONTROL THE AREA ITSELF INCLUDING INDIA WOULD NOT BE OCCUPIED BY AMERICAN TROOPS OR PLANES BUT WE SHOULD WANT TO USE THE INDIAN PORTION AS AN AIR HIGHWAY FOR OUR PLANES EN ROUTE TO CHINA.





THE GRAND STRATEGY OF ACTUAL OPERATIONS IN THE THREE AREAS WOULD REMAIN AS THEY ARE TODAY THE SUBJECT OF STUDY AND DECISIONS BY THE COMBINED STAFFS BOTH HERE AND IN LONDON AND THE JOINT COMMITTEES ON SHIPPING, ON RAW MATERIALS AND ON MUNITIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS THEY DO NOT -- ALL SUBJECT TO OUR JOINT APPROVAL.

I WISH YOU WOULD THINK THIS OVER. IT APPEALS TO ME
BECAUSE OF THE SIMPLIFICATION IT OFFERS UNDER EXISTING OPERATIONAL
DIFFICULTIES. INCIDENTALLY I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE
AUSTRALIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS, DUTCH AND CHINESE WOULD RATHER WELCOME
IT.

BEST OF LUCK.

ROOSEVELT

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	CHARLEST P. C.	407	11			

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 9 1971

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

PURELY PERSONAL

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON March 10, 1942. "Foreign Relations
of The U. S. 1942 Vol. 1,
Gaussal, British The Factors
Commonwealth, The Factors
4-27-60, 033

No. 1/6 I have given much thought to the problem of India and
I am grateful that you have kept me in touch with it.

As you can well realize, I have felt much diffidence in making any suggestions, and it is a subject which, of course, all of you good people know far more about than I do.

I have tried to approach the problem from the point of view of history and with a hope that the injection of a new thought to be used in India might be of assistance to you.

That is why I go back to the inception of the Government of the United States. During the Revolution, from

1775 to 1783, the British Colonies set themselves up as
Thirteen States, each one under a different form of
government, although each one assumed individual sovereignty.



While the war lasted there was great confusion between these separate sovereignties, and the only two connecting links were the Continental Congress (a body of ill-defined powers and large inefficiencies) and second the Continental Army which was rather badly maintained by the Thirteen States.

In 1783, at the end of the war, it was clear that the new responsibilities of the thirteen sovereignties could not be welded into a Federal Union because the experiment was still in the making and any effort to arrive at a final framework would have come to naught.

Therefore, the thirteen sovereignties joined in the Articles of Confederation, an obvious stop-gap government, to remain in effect only until such time as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union. The thirteen sovereignties, from 1783 to 1789, proved, through lack of a Federal power, that they would soon fly apart into separate nations. In 1787 a Constitutional Convention was held with only twenty-five or thirty active participants,



representing all of the States. They met, not as a Parliament, but as a small group of sincere patriots, with the sole objective of establishing a Federal Government. The discussion was recorded but the meetings were not held before an audience. The present Constitution of the United States resulted and soon received the assent of two-thirds of the States.

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up

of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed
by a small representative group, covering different castes,

occupations, religions and geographies -- this group to be

recognized as a temporary Dominion Government. It would, of

course, represent existing governments of the British Provinces

and would also represent the Council of Princes.

But my principal thought is that it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent government for the whole country. -- this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years or at least until a year after the end of the war. I suppose that this governing group,



speaking for the new Dominion, would have certain executive and administrative powers over public services, such as finances, railways, telegraphs and other things which we call public services.

Perhaps the analogy of some such method to the travails and problems of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Date NOV 1 1971



For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though
I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of
my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the
successful fight that you and I are making.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Damity Archivist of the U.S.

By Dobath Vi Crowny

Date NOV 1 1971

FURELY PERSONAL

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON

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Roosevelt

March 10,1942 Released J.L.McCrea







THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

DRAFT TELEGRAM



March 25, 1942.

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No. 117 CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAS APPROACHED ME ABOUT THE SAME MATTER ABOUT WHICH HE APPARENTLY CABLED YOU, NAMELY THE MILITARY COMMAND IN BURMA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONSIDER A COMMAND UNDER STILWELL FOR THE WHOLE OPERATION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT STILWELL COMMAND ON THE NORTHERN END WITH THE SOUTHERN PART UNDER BRITISH COMMAND.

I AM PLEASED THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK WANTS TO USE STILWELL
BECAUSE I THINK IT MEANS WE WILL GET MORE EFFECTIVE MILITARY
COMMAND IN THE CHINESE SECTOR AND IT WILL MEAN A CLOSER WORKING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL OF US AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK WHICH I
CONSIDER TO BE OF VERY GREAT INPORTANCE.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS.

ROOSEVELT

3-16-42 Original copy which was added to in the President's handwriting delivered to Miss Tully this date.

	DECLASSIF	IED		
By Deputy	Archivis	t of	the	U.S.
By Deputy	·Stewa	ut		
Date	ICT 121	971		

DRAFT TELEGRAM



MARCH 13, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

ABOUT WHICH HE APPARENTLY CABLED YOU, NAMELY THE MILITARY COMMAND
IN BURMA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONSIDER A COMMAND UNDER STILWELL FOR THE
WHOLE OPERATION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT STILWELL COMMAND ON THE
NORTHERN END WITH DESIGNMENT APPENDING IN CALL TO THE CONTRACT OF THE CONTRACT O

I AM PLEASED THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK WANTS TO USE STILWELL
BECAUSE I THINK IT MEANS WE WILL GET MORE EFFECTIVE MILITARY
COMMAND IN THE CHINESE SECTOR AND IT WILL MEAN A CLOSER WORKING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL OF US AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK WHICH I
CONSIDER TO BE OF VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS.

Rusuch

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.C. Towart

TELEGRAM

MARCH 16, 1942

No 118.

TO: LONDON

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM HOPKINS
YOUR WIRE TO ME RELATIVE TO TANKER SINKINGS WILL BE
ANSWERED WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS.

PRESIDENT ANXIOUS TO HEAR FROM YOU RELATIVE TO HIS CABLES NUMBER 115 AND NUMBER 117.

BM.

HARRY HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By E. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972



#119

3-16-42

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL AND SECRET X PREFER TO MEET REQUEST

CONTAINED IN YOUR DESPATCH NUMBER FORTYFOUR REGARDING IRONCLAD AS TO TEMPORARY

REPLACEMENT OF FORCE HYPO BY SENDING DETACHMENT TO JOIN HOME FLEET EQUIVALENT IN

STRENGTH TO FORCE DETACHED THEREFROM TO REPLACE FORCE HYPO PARA OUR SHIPS NOW

BEING MADE READY WITH VIEW TO EARLY DEPARTURE



Kasevel -

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Dato 9CT 1 2 1971

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TELEGRAM



March 16, 1942.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No. 120. Apropos my No. 119 this afternoon I feel that it would be more advisable if we reinforce your Home Fleet temporarily and you detach such ships as are necessary either to replace your H Force or to do the whole escorting job itself. We would send a force of two battleships, two cruisers, an aircraft carrier and a squadron of destroyers to take up their position at such bases like Scapa as are agreed upon between the Admiralty and the Navy. The difficulties of our operating in Gibraltar are very considerable and I should much prefer to reinforce your Home Fleet in a manner that would enable you to release the appropriate number of ships.

Harry has shown me your cable to him relative to the tanker sinkings, which are very disturbing.

In Admiral King's despatch number 2335 of February second to the Admiralty we hoped that ten United States destroyers would thus be made available for work on the Atlantic seaboard. This has not worked out completely because it has been necessary to reinforce east bound British midocean escorts and because of the weakness of the Canadian western local escorts it has been necessary for United States units to remain with them ten degrees of longitude to the westward of the agreed limit.



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Years

Date 007 1 2 1971

The trawlers which you mention have only recently arrived or are approaching. Those here are undergoing essential voyage repairs but some will be operating within the week.

I hope that you can have a talk with Admiral Pound to see if
we can't get the complete revision of the trans-Atlantic escort
working so that the ten destroyers can get on to the patrol along
our Atlantic seaboard. I hope this would be temporary because I have
always held destroyers should not be used coast patrol as they are all
purpose ships.

It seems to me that there are two things that would enable us more effectively to deal with the submarine here during the next few weeks. The first would be to open the cycle of trans-Atlantic convoys to eight days from now until July first. By that time our mounting production of small escort vessels and planes will come fully into play. I realize this means that your imports would be decreased during the next quarter but I am sure with our merchant shipbuilding program going as well as it is that we can make up for that in the second half of the year. I know you will bear in mind in connection with this that the prospective relief of one of your heavy forces will take several destroyers from the Atlantic. I am sure none can be spared from the Pacific. I think it would be unwise to consider a proposal to provide fewer destroyers with each convoy. This would, it seems to me, only invite attack.

The second measure that would help us in the immediate situation would be an instruction from you that British controlled shipping



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.S. Stourant

Date UCT 1 2 1971

conform to routes prescribed by the Navy in the western Atlantic.

Some of your ships, as well as ours, that have been torpedeed have had on their running lights. It is very important that the routes conform to our distribution of escorting vessels.

I feel sure we are going to get on top of this but it requires some help from you during the next few weeks. Will you let me know how this strikes you.

I shall be sorry to see Casey go but I think you are giving him a more important assignment. I am sure you have made an excellent choice.

ROOSEVELT

3/19/42 1045

Original copy (added to bey
the Bresident) returned to
Miss Tully this date,
via Mrs. Brasy



DECLASSIFIED								
By Dep	uty Ar	chivist	of	the	U.S.			
By Dep	w. R	. 54	w	au	-			
Date_	OUT	1 2 19	71					

TELEGRAM



MARCH 16, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

MORE ADVISABLE IF WE REINFORCE YOUR HOME FLEET TEMPORARILY AND
YOU DETACH SUCH SHIPS AS ARE NECESSARY EITHER TO REPLACE YOUR H
FORCE

THERT OR TO DO THE WHOLE ESCORTING JOB ITSELF. WE WOULD SEND
A FORCE OF TWO BATTLESHIPS, TWO CRUISERS, AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND
A SQUADRON OF DESTROYERS TO TAKE UP THEIR POSITION AT SUCH BASES
AS ARE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE ADMIRALTY AND THE NAVY. THE

DIFFICULTIES OF OUR OPERATING IN GIBRALTER ARE VERY CONSIDERABLE
AND I SHOULD MUCH PREFER TO REINFORCE YOUR HOME FLEET IN A MANNER
THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO RELEASE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF SHIPS.

HARRY HAS SHOWN ME YOUR CABLE TO HIM RELATIVE TO THE TANKER SINKINGS, WHICH ARE VERY DISTURBING.

IN ADMIRAL KING'S DESPATCH NUMBER 2335 OF FEBRUARY SECOND

TO THE ADMIRALTY WE HOPE THAT TEN UNITED STATES DESTROYERS WOULD

THUS BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR WORK ON THE ATLANTIC SEABOARD. THIS HAS

NOT WORKED OUT COMPLETELY BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO

REINFORCE EAST BOUND BRITISH MIDOCEAN ESCORTS AND BECAUSE OF THE

WEAKNESS OF THE CANADIAN WESTERN LOCAL ESCORTS IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY

FOR UNITED STATES UNITS TO REMAIN WITH THEM TEN DEGREES OF

LONGITUDE TO THE WESTWARD OF THE AGREED LIMIT.



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Stewart

Date 007 1 2 1971

THE TRAVLERS WHICH YOU MENTION HAVE ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED OR ARE APPROACHING. THOSE HERE ARE UNDERGOING ESSENTIAL VOYAGE REPAIRS BUT SOME WILL BE OPERATING WITHIN THE WEEK.

I HOPE THAT YOU CAN HAVE A TALK WITH ADMIRAL POUND TO SEE IF
WE CAN'T GET THE COMPLETE REVISION OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC ESCORT
WORKING SO THAT THE TEN DESTROYERS CAN GET ON TO THE PATROL ALONG
OUR ATLANTIC SEABOARD. I have always held destroyers ohome

US MORE EFFECTIVELY TO DEAL WITH THE SUBMARINE HERE DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO OPEN THE CYCLE OF TRANSATLANTIC CONVOYS TO EIGHT DAYS FROM NOW UNTIL JULY FIRST. BY THAT TIME OUR MOUNTING PRODUCTION OF SMALL ESCORT VESSELS AND PLANES WILL COME FULLY INTO PLAY. I REALIZE THIS MEANS THAT YOUR IMPORTS WOULD BE DECREASED DURING THE NEXT QUARTER BUT I AM SURE WITH OUR MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM GOING AS WELL AS IT IS THAT WE CAN MAKE UP FOR THAT IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR. I KNOW YOU WILL BEAR IN MIND IN CONNECTION WITH THIS THAT THE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF OF ONE OF YOUR HEAVY FORCES WILL TAKE SEVERAL DESTROYERS FROM THE ATLANTIC. I AM SURE NONE CAN BE SPARED FROM THE PACIFIC. I THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE FEWER DESTROYERS WITH EACH CONVOY. THIS WOULD, IT SEEMS TO ME, ONLY INVITE ATTACK.

THE SECOND MEASURE THAT WOULD HELP US IN THE IMMEDIATE
SITUATION WOULD BE AN INSTRUCTION FROM YOU THAT BRITISH CONTROLLED



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Dato 12 1971

SHIPPING CONFORM TO ROUTES PRESCRIBED BY THE NAVY IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC. SOME OF YOUR SHIPS, AS WELL AS OURS, THAT HAVE BEEN TORPEDOED HAVE HAD ON THEIR RUNNING LIGHTS. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE ROUTES CONFORM TO OUR DISTRIBUTION OF ESCORTING VESSELS.

I FEEL SURE WE ARE GOING TO GET ON TOP OF THIS BUT IT REQUIRES SOME HELP FROM YOU DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. WILL YOU LET ME KNOW HOW THIS STRIKES YOU.

I SHALL BE SORRY TO SEE CASEY GO BUT I THINK YOU ARE GIVING HIM A MORE IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT. I AM SURE YOU HAVE MADE AN EXCELLENT CHOICE.

ROOSEVELT

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date

No 121 Albac



From President Roosevelt to the Former Naval Person colon General MacArthur and a small staff arrived in Australia by air today stop Since the Prime Minister of Australia as well as New Zealand had proposed a United States supreme commander in that region, suggesting Brett, I had instructed Brett immediately on MacArthur's arrival to propose the latter officer to Mr. Curtin as Supreme Commander in Australia stop Brett in Cabling MacArthur's arrival reports that Mr. Curtin enthusiastically accepts MacArthur stop They urge immediate joint press release to avoid leak stop This I think highly important if Axis propaganda attacking MacArthur's departure from Philippines is to be forestalled stop Therefore I authorized a press release at ten thirty A.M. Washington time announcing MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander in that region stop This action will in no way interfere with procedure of determining strategic areas and spheres of responsibility through established

channels

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Sand French

DECLASSIFI By Deputy Archivist

By W! Stewart

TELEGRAM

MARCH 17, 1942

PERSONAL AND FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT NO. 122

YOU PROBABLY HAVE HEARD OF THE GOOD GO WE HAD AT THEM OUT IN NEW GUINEA THE OTHER DAY.

A SUBSTANTIAL TASK FORCE WAS IN THE SALAMOA-LAE AREA
APPARENTLY WAITING TO PROTECT A GOOD-SIZED TROOP CONVOY. OUR
TASK FORCE STEAMED INTO THE GULF OF PAPUA ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF
THE PENINSULA TO A POINT SOME ONE HUNDRED TWENTYRIVE MILES DISTANT
FROM SALAMOA. 105 OF OUR PLANES TOOK OFF FROM A CARRIER AND CAUGHT
THE ENEMY COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE INFLICTING THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE:

TWO HEAVY CRUISERS SUNK; ONE LIGHT CRUISER BELIEVED SUNK;

ONE DESTROYER PROBABLY SUNK; TWO DESTROYERS BADLY DAMAGED AND

POSSIBLY SUNK; FIVE TRANSPORTS OR STORE SHIPS SUNK OR BADLY

DAMAGED BY FIRE; TWO PATROL CRAFT BURNED, POSSIBLY SUNK; ONE

MINELAYER LEFT BURNING, PROBABLY SUNK; ONE SEAPLANE TENDER

SERIOUSLY DAMAGED.

IT WAS GOOD COORDINATION WITH OUR SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT WHO
FOLLOWED OUR NAVAL PLANES THE NEXT DAY. THESE PLANES, AUSTRALIAN
AND AMERICAN BOMBERS, ATTACKED THE CONVOY AS WELL AS MAKING FURTHER
ATTACK IN THE SALAMOA-LAE AREA.

ALL IN ALL IT WAS A GOOD DAY'S WORK BECAUSE WE GOT AWAY WITH
THE LOSS OF ONLY ONE PLANE AND OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE
JAPS STILL DON'T KNOW HOW THEY WERE HIT. IT WAS BY ALL MEANS THE
BEST DAY'S WORK WE HAVE HAD.

Rauseneh 122

Bot.

March 18, 1942.

Dear Winston:-

I am sure you know that I have been thinking a lot about your troubles during the past month. We might as well admit the difficult military side of the problems; and you have the additional burdens which your delightful unwritten Constitution puts your form of government into in war times just as much as in peace time. Seriously, the American written Constitution, with its four year term, saves the unfortunate person at the top a wast number of headaches.

Next in order is that delightful god, which we worship in common, called "The Freedom of the Press". Neither one of us is such plagued by the news stories which, on the whole, are not so bad. But literally we are both menaced by the so-called interpretative comment by a handful or two of gentlemen who cannot get politics out of their heads in the worst crisis, who have little background and less knowledge, and who undertake to lead public opinion on that basis.

My own press — the worst of it — the McCormack-Patterson people, the Hearst papers and the Scripps-Howard chain — are persistently magnifying relatively unimportant domestic matters and subtly suggesting that the American role is to defend Hawaii, our east and west coasts, do the turtle act, and wait until somebody attacks our home shores. Curiously enough these survivors of isolationism are not attacking me personally except to reiterste that I am dreadfully over-burdened, or that I am my own strategist, operating without benefit of military or naval advice. It is the same old story. You are femiliar with it.

Here is a thought from this amateur strategist. There is no use giving a single further thought to Singapore or the Dutch Indies. They are gone. Australia must be held and, as I telegraphed you, we are willing to undertake that. India must be held and you must do that; but, frankly, I do not worry so much about that problem as many others do. The Japanese may land on the seacoast west of Burma. They may be bard Calcutta. But I do not visualize that they can

Revisued for exhibit
8/21/91

get enough troops to make more than a few dents on the borders -and I think you can hold Ceylon. I hope you can get more
submarines out there -- more valuable than an inferior surface
facet.

I hope you will definitely reinforce the Near East more greatly than at present. You must hold Egypt, the Canal, Syria, Iran and the route to the Caucasus.

Finally, I expect to send you in a few days a more definite plan for a joint attack in Europe itself.

By the time you get this you will have been advised of my talk with Litvinov, and I expect a reply from Stalin shortly. I know you will not mind my being brutally frank when I tell you that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so.

My Navy has been definitely slack in preparing for this submarine war off our coast. As I need not tell you, most Naval officers have declined in the past to think in terms of any vessel of less than two thousand tons. You learned the lesson two years ago. We still have to learn it. By May first I expect to get a pretty good coastal patrol working from Newfoundland to Florida and through the West Indies. I have begged, borrowed and stolen every vessel of every description over eighty feet long — and I have made this a separate command with the responsibility in Admiral Andrews.

I know you will keep up your optimism and your grand driving force, but I know you will not mind If I tell you that you ought to take a leaf out of my notebook. Once a month I go to Hyde Park for four days, crawl into a hole and pull the hole in after me. I am called on the telephone only if something of really great importance occurs. I wish you would try it, and I wish you would lay a few bricks or paint another picture.

Give my warm regards to Mrs. Churchill. I wish much that my wife and I could see her.

As ever yours,

The Honorable
Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Hinister of England,
London,
England.

P.S. Winant is here. I think he is really a most understanding person.

3-18-42

NO.123 YOUR NUMBER FORTY EIGHT X WE WILL SEND DEPARTING ABOUT MARCH TWENTY THIRD DETACHMENT UNDER COMMAND OF WILCOX COMPRISING ONE NEW BATTLESHIP TWO HEAVY CRUISERS ONE CARRIER FIVE OR SIX DESTROYERS TO REPORT FOR TEMPORARY DUTY TO GHORMLEY TO BE UNDER OPERATIONAL ORDERS OF CINC HOME FLEET PARA WE WILL KEEP READY ON THIS SIDE SIMILAR DETACHMENT IN POSITION SUITED TO HEAD OFF ENEMY WHEN HE COMES INTO OPEN ATLANTIC PARA WE FEEL THAT YOU CAN NOW INCLUDE BATTLESHIP IN YOUR REPLACEMENT FOR FORCE HYPO AND OTHERWISE MAKE IT MORE NEARLY ADEQUATE

EN.

Prosenel

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Determine Decrease Decrea



WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

3/19/42

With reference to the attached message from the Prime Minister it is recommended that a reply somewhat as follows be dispatched:

No. 124 "For the former Naval person. Reference your message concerning command in Burma I have urgently requested the Generalissimo to continue reinforcing the Burma front and to permit Stilwell to make cooperative arrangements relative command according to the principles laid down in his original directive approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Recent messages from Stilwell indicate that he and Alexander can continue to work effectively together but that the urgent need is for additional Chinese troops. The Generalissimo has placed Stilwell in command of the 5th and 6th Chinese Armies but unfortunately will not permit completion of their transfer to Burma pending clarification of the command situation. Stilwell has not only urgently requested the Generalissimo to recede from this position but has actually ordered additional units southward in the hope that the Generalissimo will approve. Despite command complications Stilwell provides a means of assuring complete cooperation whereas a Chinese commander might make the situation impossible for General Alexander. Stilwell is not only an immensely capable and resourceful individual but is thoroughly acquainted with the Chinese people, speaks their language fluently, and is distinctly not a self-seeker. His latest telegram states: 'Have arranged with General Alexander for cooperation and matter of command need not affect conduct of operations. Have asked the Generalissimo to start another three divisions toward Burma. Under the circumstances I suggest we should

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Date- FEB 1 4 1972

Signature- RAHERS



leave the command status at that for the present. I feel that Generals Alexander and Stilwell will co-operate admirably. Strange that these two who were originally intended to meet at Super-Gymnast should in fact meet . at Maymyo.

Truck Strinson

Secretary of War.

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Date- FEB 1 4 1972

Signature- Russ

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 121, 5200.9 (9/27/58)

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date- NOV



Signature- MARS March 19, 1942.

Memorandum for the President:

Those of us who are directly concerned with combating the Atlantic submarine menace are not at all sure that the British are applying sufficient effort to bombing German submarine bases and building (repair) yards. We are aware that intelligence reports indicate that some of these bases are well protected against bombing, but we are nevertheless convinced that raids in adequate force, pressed well home, can seriously hamper building and repair work. The close proximity of many of these bases to the United Kingdom should facilitate offensive operations against them.

It seems that the R.A.F. is not fully cooperative in complying with the views of the Admiralty in this (and other) matters relative to the selection of military objectives - and that in such cases it requires a directive from "higher authority" to attain the necessary action.

I have therefore to propose for your consideration a message to Mr. Churchill reading somewhat as follows:

No. 125 "Your interest in steps to be taken to combat the Atlantic submarine menace as indicated by your recent message to Mr. Hopkins on this subject impels me to request your particular consideration of heavy attacks on submarine bases and building and repair yards thus checking submarine activities at their source and where submarines perforce Kurweh & congregate."

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

March 22, 1942

and Urgent

Dear Miss Tully:

Please have this message from the President to Mr. Churchill which the President has already approved numbered and sent off in the customary way in which these messages from the President are transmitted to London.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely the

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED State Dent

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Bate FEB 1 4 1972

Miss Grace Tully,

Secretary to the President, The White House. PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect | Full rate | Day letter | Night letter

Charge Department:

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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State



Washington,

March 証, 1942. 22,

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON .

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON No. 126

We have been keeping Halifax informed of the progress of our attempts to obtain from Vichy definite commitments to supplement the assurances already given that it will not afford military aid either direct or indirect to the Axis and that its colonial territories in North Africa and the Western Hemisphere will not be available as bases for the Germans.

The terms of the French replies have been communicated to you.

Under these circumstances, I am considering whether as part of the United Nations' effort we cannot fulfill a useful role by resuming the program of limited economic assistance to North Africa and by sending further Red Cross aid to children in France to help keep the French people in line. The success of recent bombing operations such as at Renault factories and the realization which that must have brought to the French people that they are still in the war are a way of thwarting the collaborationists. It seems to me that it would be useful to

Enciphered by ______ By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

by operator By W. MJ. Stewart Date FEB 14 197

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Department of State

Charge Department: Appartment

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Charge to 2 -

Washington,
DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 14 1972

supplement this by another method. At a time when the United Nations are preparing to meet the enemy by force before it can occupy various areas it seems to me important that we should take advantage of the possibility that we can hold the Axis off from other areas by using such psychological and economic weapons as are available.

Should France go over it would mean, of course, that the Iberian Peninsula as well is lost to us. We are obtaining for our common cause vital military and strategic information by the presence of our observers in North Africa and from our missions in France itself. In order that this remaining bridgehead to Europe may be held as long as it serves our purpose it is necessary that our position there be reinforced from time to time through limited economic aid, thereby not abandoning the field entirely to the Germans.

I am therefore proposing to resume this economic effort al Such a moment as may appear expedient and wanted to let you know beforehand of this step, which I am convinced may prove of immense importance to the aims of the United Nations.

Enciphered by

1

ACTING

ills leting

Sent by operator ______ M., _____, 1

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date OCT 1 2 1971

MARCH 22, 1942

AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I AM GREATLY DISTURBED AT THE PUBLICITY COMING OUT OF THE CASEY BUSINESS. IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE GETTING ATTENTION ALL OUT OF PROPORTION TO ITS IMPORTANCE.

I AM PARTICULARLY DISTURBED AT WHAT I LEARN FROM THE PAPERS:
THAT CURTIN, ON THE ONE HAND, MAY BE GOING TO PUBLISH A DETAILED
WHITE PAPER AND THAT YOU, ON THE OTHER, FEEL THAT YOU MAY HAVE TO
DISCUSS THE MATTER PUBLICLY IN PARLIAMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT
ALL OF THIS PLAYS RIGHT INTO THE HANDS OF OUR ENEMIES AND IF THERE
IS ANY WAY THAT ALL FURTHER PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF IT COULD CEASE
IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALL AROUND.

I HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH EVATT ABOUT THIS AND HE IS SENDING TO CURTIN THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT I AM CABLING TO YOU.

THE CASEY APPOINTMENT, I REALIZE, IS BUT AN INCIDENT. THE MORE IMPORTANT MATTER IS THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP OF GREAT BRITAIN TO AUSTRALIA. I SENSE A GROWING FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY OF IMPATIENCE AT WHAT APPEARS PUBLICLY TO BE A RATHER STRAINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.

I AM SIMPLY WONDERING HOW SOMETHING MIGHT BE DONE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO CHANGE ALL THAT TO AN ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD WILL WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITY OF OUR MILITARY EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ENEMY. I CONFESS AT THE MOMENT THAT I
HAVE NOTHING TO PROPOSE ALTHOUGH I AM GOING TO DIRECT MY MIND
TOWARDS IT AND IF I THINK OF ANYTHING I WILL LET YOU KNOW.


I SAY THIS TO YOU EECAUSE I FEEL MYSELF GREATLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE TURN OF EVENTS. I TOLD CASEY QUITE FRANKLY THAT I HOPED
HE WOULD TAKE THE JOB IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE HE WOULD BE A
PERSON IN THE AREA WHO WOULD KNOW BOTH THE AMERICAN AND
AUSTRALIAN ANGLES AS WELL AS THE ERITISH, AND I STILL THINK THE
DECISION FOR CASEY TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS A WISE ONE.

Revoweld



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By OCT 1 2 1971



TRIEGRAM

March 26, 1942.

TO:

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM:

THE PRESIDENT

No. 128

EVATT HAS TOLD ME THE SUBSTANCE OF A CABLE FROM CURTIN RELATIVE TO THE THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, IN WHICH CURTIN EXPRESSES HIS GREAT ANXIETY AT LEAVING THE THIRD DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE ADVISED THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER IN THE ABSENCE OF EVATT, WHO HAS GONE TO NEW YORK, THAT WE WOULD WITHDRAW ALL CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO SENDING AN ADDITIONAL AMERICAN DIVISION TO AUSTRALIA AND THAT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES CHE ADDITIONAL AMERICAN DIVISION WILL GO AS SCON AS POSSIBLE. I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT MY ORIGINAL ADVICE AS TO LEAVING THE FINAL AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST EXPRESSED MY OPINION AND THAT I HAD NOT CHANGED IT.

I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER THE AUSTRALIAN DIVISION SHOULD BE SENT HOME OR NOT MUST BE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER CURTIN AND NOT BY ME.

ROOSEVELT

The original copy of this despatch was altered in the President's handwriting and was therefore returned to Miss Tully for historical files. DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Aphivist of the U.S.

Date

TELEGRAM

D. B. W.

16 MARCH 25, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 128

EVATT HAS TOLD ME THE SUBSTANCE OF A CABLE FROM CURTIN
RELATIVE TO THE THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, IN WHICH CURTIN
EXPRESSES HIS GREAT ANXIETY AT LEAVING THE THIRD DIVISION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE ADVISED THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER IN THE ABSENCE OF
EVATT, WHO HAS GONE TO NEW YORK, THAT WE WOULD WITHDRAW ALL
CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO SENDING AN ADDITIONAL DIVISION TO AUSTRALIA
AND THAT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES ONE ADDITIONAL DIVISION WILL GO
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT MY ORIGINAL
ADVICE AS TO LEAVING THE FINAL AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST EXPRESSED MY OPINION AND THAT I HAD NOT CHANGED IT.

I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER THE CURTING DIVISION SHOULD BE SENT OR NOT MUST BE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER CURTIN AND NOT BY ME.

ROOSEVELT

usuch

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Stowart

Date 0.1 2 1971

TELEGRAM

APRIL 1, 1942

TO:

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM:

THE PRESIDENT

NO. 129

AS I HAVE COMPLETED SURVEY OF THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE PROBLEMS OF THE MILITARY SITUATIONS FACING THE UNITED NATIONS, I HAVE COME TO CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE SO VITAL THAT I WANT YOU TO KNOW THE WHOLE PICTURE AND TO ASK YOUR APPROVAL. THE WHOLE OF IT IS SO DEPENDENT ON COMPLETE COOPERATION BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES THAT HARRY AND MARSHALL WILL LEAVE FOR LONDON IN A FEW DAYS TOPRESENT FIRST OF ALL TO YOU THE SALIENT POINTS. IT IS A PLAN TO WHICH I HOPE RUSSIA WILL GREET WITH ENTHUSIASM AND, ON WORD FROM YOU WHEN YOU HAVE SEEN HARRY AND MARSHALL, I PROPOSE TO ASK STALIN TO SEND TWO SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO SEE ME AT ONCE.

I THINK IT WILL WORK OUT IN FULL ACCORD WITH TREND OF PUBLIC OPINION HERE AND IN BRITAIN. AND, FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO LABEL IT THE PLAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ROOSEVELT

ariginal in long hand given to him Villy by me



	DECLA				
By Deputy	y Archi	yist	of	the	U.S.
By Deputy	e.l.	ite	MO.	t	
Date_	ncy 1	2 19	1		

april 1,1942 Mv.129 4.5.0 Former Nadal Person his I have cumpliful queriery of the unnesdiate and long range forablismes of The military Com to certain conclusions which are so wital that I went you to Sinow the whole picture and to not your affrical. The whole of it is to defendant and Campbeter exoperation by The U.K. and U.S. That Harry und Harshall will trace for London in a fraday is

all the valirat paints. Prasin will great with mothering had, on word from your when you have seen Harry o Marchall I propose to ask stook Malin. Tomal 2 ofseint representations beer me at me HI I think it will work and in full accord with trand of proble Muson here and on Butan. and finally, I wanted Like Atrable & tabel it Nortinum Traver Travel

PROPOSAL IN YOUR NUMBER EXECUTED OF MARCH THIRTYFIRST DOES NOT MENTION AVAILABILITY OF
FURIOUS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE UNITED STATES APRIL THIRD FOR THE CLYDE VIA
BERMUDA AND WHOSE PLANS SHOW ELEVATORS LARGE ENOUGH FOR SPITFIRES PARA ADMIRAL KING
WILL ADVISE ADMIRAL POUND THROUGH GHORMLEY THAT WASP IS AT DISPOSAL AS YOU REQUEST
IF OUR ESTIMATE AS TO FURIOUS SHOULD BE INCORRECT

Russell

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

DRAFT TELEGRAM



APRIL 3, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 131

RELATIVE TO YOUR NUMBER 59 AND THE OPERATION TO WHICH YOU ARE COMMITTED I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO IDENTIFY THE EXPEDITION IN THE MANNER INDICATED BY YOU. MY REASON FOR THIS IS THAT WE ARE THE ONLY NATION THAT CAN INTERVENE DIPLOMATICALLY WITH ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS WITH VICHY AND IT SEEMS TO ME EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE ABLE TO DO THIS WITHOUT THE COMPLICATIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE BY THE DROPPING OF LEAFELTS OR OTHER INFORMAL METHODS IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OPERATION. I DO HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH THIS.

ROOSEVELT

All and the same constitution

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Hound

Date 0C7 1 2 1971

132

at the decelion of the President a Churchill

- purcher (# /32) was given to this despatch. The

President further directed that This despatch

be sent to his. Hopking who in turn would

give it to his. Churchill. The heading

marked (*) should therefor he dispersell, 1942

the minutes was quick by me to thicker see.

AMEMBASSY Welles. This despatch was next

LONDON. By the State Dept.

V. L. his Crea

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

No 132

* Please deliver immediately the following message from the President to the former naval person:

QUOTE I most earnestly hope that you may find it possible to postpone Cripps's departure from India until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations.

I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the United States believes that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary. The feeling on the contrary is almost universally held that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical military and naval defense control to the competent British authorities. American public opinion cannot understand why,



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By NOV 1 1971

if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war.

I feel I must place this issue before you very frankly and I know you will understand my reasons for so doing. If the present negotiations are allowed to collapse because of the issuesasspresented to the American people and India should subsequently be successfully invaded by Japan with attendant serious military or naval defeats for our side, the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion can hardly be over-estimated.

Consequently, would it not be possible for you to have Cripps postpone his departure on the ground that you personally have sent him instructions to make a final effort to find a common ground of understanding. I learned that an agreement seemed very near last Thursday night. If he could be authorized by you to state that he was empowered by you personally to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that minor concessions would be made by both sides, it



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Date NOV 1 1971

seems to me that an agreement might yet be found.

I still feel, as I expressed to you in an earlier message, that if the component-groups in India could now be given the opportunity to set up a nationalist government similar in essence to our own form of government under the Articles of Confederation with the understanding that upon the termination of a period of trial and error they would then be enabled to determine upon their own form of constitution and, as you have already promised them, to determine their future relationship with the British Empire, a solution could probably be found. If you made such an effort and Cripps were then still unable to find an agreement, you would at least on that issue have public opinion in the United States satisfied that a real offer and a fair offer had been made by the British Government to the peoples of India and that the responsibility for such failure must clearly be placed upon the Indian people and not upon the British Government. UNQUOTE

U:SW:IJ



By Daputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Date NOV 1 1971

April 14, 1942.

PRIORITY

From: POTUS

To : Hopkins for Former Naval Person.

I have read and approved message McNarney to Marshall re planes for India and want to emphasize the following:

I consider it very unwise to curtail planes now on way to Stillwell. A very despondent message has come from the Generalissimo and I believe considerations of high policy call for air help to Burma theatre at once as Chinese position must be sustained.

I believe plan A of our Staff is by far the better.

Three: It is my belief Japanese land attack on Ceylon will not be made for several weeks.

Four: I hope United Nations shipping will be kept out of Bay of Bengal.

I hope British warships will for the time being stay under umbrella of land based planes while in vicinity of Southern India and Ceylon.

The quickest and easiest increase in air strength in Indian theatre is to let us send all possible planes now here earmarked for British account in order to bring Brereton up to strength. This large movement can start in 48 hours after we hear from you.

ROOSEVELT.

RELEASED 2325 - 14 APRIL 1942 JOHN L. MCCREA, Caca Captain, USN. Naval Aide to President.

DECLASSIFIED By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date.

DECLASSIFIED By Authority of ARDER SEC.

By RHE Date MAY 1 1972

No. 320

April 14, 1942.

McNarney From:

(IN CONNECTION WITH THIS DESPATCH SEE MESSAGE NO. 133 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON)

To: Marshall

The following data and recommendations are submitted in accordance with your No. 2398, April 14. Urgent for General Marshall from McNarney with Admiral King and Generals Arnold and Eisenhower concurring. We concur with the estimate of the British Chiefs of Staff as to the importance of the India-Middle East area, and as to the probable results on the Russian position that would follow the loss of the Middle East. We likewise concur in the character of the assistance required by the British in order to make the Bay of Bengal and Indian area reasonably secure.

At this moment no (repeat no) planes allocated to the U.S. Army Air Force are available for transfer to India or the Middle East. Units now engaged in such critical tasks as the combatting of the submarine menace on our East Coast are pitifully small and are all badly under strength. Admiral King states that the tasks assigned the U.S. Naval Forces are so numerous and of such importance that no diversions can be made at this time.

The only source from which land type airplanes of American manufacture can be secured immediately is from those already allocated to the British. The following information is given on the types and numbers available. Considerable numbers of these are now held on various fields in the U.S., due to congestion of the British ferry route, particularly at Montreal, and cannot be cleared through that route to any destination. These include bombardment types only and exclude all airplanes known to be non-operational for lack of guns, turrets, etc.: 35 B-25; 25 LB-30; 8 B-17s. These numbers are exclusive of greater quantities which are non-operational because of lack of guns or other equipment now in England; for example, 23 Lockheeds at Fort Wayne and 67 B-26s at Omaha.

With respect to pursuit types there are likewise available considerable quantities which are crated and ready for shipment and can be diverted to the Indian region by the first available shipping.

Proposed plans for employment of these airplanes in India is given as follows: Plan A. The 10th Air Force, now in India, comprises one pursuit group and one composite bombardment group of one heavy bombardment squadron and two medium bombardment squadrons. To this force should be added one heavy reconnaissance squadron of LB-30s. The plan would provide for bringing the 10th Air Force to full operational strength immediately by ferrying appropriate numbers of the



operationally fit bombers, above listed, to India and by transferring pursuit planes by use of the U.S. aircraft carrier Ranger. This ship to be loaded with crated fighters which will be set up en route, and flown off at Monrovia. From that point the planes would be flown to General Brereton, commanding the 10th Air Force.

Plan B. To provide ferrying crews only for the bombers above listed and turn them over to the British upon arrival in India. This plan is suggested by the statement in the British appreciation, "aircraft rather than personnel are our primary immediate requirement." However, we doubt that the British air personnel already in India is sufficiently strong in qualified pilots and combat crews to operate this equipment efficiently. If this plan were adopted the pursuit planes could still be moved to India by the method already described.

Admiral King definitely states that the Ranger cannot (repeat not) be made available for combat use in the Indian Ocean. This statement involves also any other major fleet unit. The only way the Navy can assist is by the use of Ranger for ferrying across the Atlantic as above described.

We desire to remind you that the 10th Air Force has been assigned to General Stilwell with an original purpose of supporting his operations. Since this diversion of the 10th Air Force to another mission will adversely affect the Chinese situation and Stilwell's operations, we deem it especially important that no attempt be made to divert any of the airplanes required to keep the AVG at full operational strength and that former assurances to the Generalissimo and Stilwell in this regard be adhered to. This applies also to other types of planes already allocated the Chinese under firm agreements.

At this point your No. 2401 containing instructions for Stilwell and Brereton arrived. The orders will be immediately sent as directed but for your information the shipping schedule is such that planes now afloat can scarcely bring the AVG to full operational strength before May 15. We estimate that Plan A as outlined will bring the 10th Air Force to operational strength at an earlier date than can be accomplished by depending upon AVG planes over and above the operational strength of that group. This message has been read and approved by the President.

(IN CONNECTION WITH THIS DESPATCH SEE MESSAGE NO. 133 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON)

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of <u>DEDER SEC</u>

By RHER Date MAY 1 1972

O appeg/14 -But THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Hopkins for Former Naval (Erron - #1339 have rend and appround the Namery Do Marshall 32 plants for Larlia mil want to imphosing the fullweiting: Vns: I consider it very maurie to Cartail Stans now on neary to Stillutell. a very dispondant missenfor hus edner fiver The Ecneralies of high Lating call for air help & Burner that the must be smust be smust be smust be Two. I bestown flow A of Baur

For Mr. Holliers to be conveyed to Parmer the WHITE HOUSE bara your despatch of april 14th para E & to the Indian Otem what would be help that is the Carriers as It is of course impossible to send Es & New Heady made available See the only one we can possibly space is the WASP para It is our view that the As I main ocean situation demands that it is & in order to apply your receive fighters to that situation para Further, that the offensive air acting is only altainable in time by stransfer of bombers from E British account to ours to be manned by is and flown to India and there operated by yes 2 para Forgoing frencises would develop a Setup whereby British novol forces need not be operated

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

April 14, 1942.

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS LONDON

Litvinov came in to ask for information of Moscow what the subject was I wished to discuss and I told him the facts and pointed out that all of this was clearly implied in my message to Stalin. I hope to have an answer shortly.

It seems true Laval is back though we have not heard officially from Leahy.

ROOSEVELT



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart DateMAR 21972



April 14, 1942.

PRIORITY

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

142146 NCR

FROM THE FRESIDENT TO MR. HARRY L HOPKINS

4777

LITVINOV CAME IN TO ASK FOR INFORMATION OF MOSCOW
WHAT THE SUBJECT WAS I WISHED TO DISCUSS AND I TOLD HIM THE
FACTS AND POINTED OUT THAT ALL OF THIS WAS CLEARLY INPLIED
IN MY MESSAGE TO STALIN. I HOPE TO HAVE AN ANSWER SHORTLY.

IT SEEMS TRUE LAVAL IS BACK THOUGH WE HAVE NOT HEARD OFFICIALLY FROM LEAHY.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1735, April 14, 1942.

JOHN L. MCCREA, Captain, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972



April 15, 1942.

FROM:

OPNAV

TO :

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Your suggestion being studied but consensus of opinion is that odor still too strong for family of nations.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1910, April, 15, 1942.

J. L. Mc Que

JOHN L. McCREA, Captain, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

April 16, 1942.



PRIORITY

FROM:

OPNAV

TO:

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 134.

YOUR SECRET NO. 69. WE HAVE BEEN AND ARE CONTINUING STUDIES OF IMMEDIATE NEEDS. I HOPE YOU WILL READ OUR AIR FORCE SUGGESTIONS SENT TO MARSHALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. THIS WOULD BE MUCH THE QUICKEST WAY OF GETTING PLANES TO INDIA THOUGH THEY WOULD BE LAND BASED PLANES AND FOR THE TIME BEING WOULD COMPEL YOU TO KEEP YOUR FLEET UNDER THEIR COVERAGE. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS PLAN WOULD DO THE MOST TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDING AT CEYLON, MADRAS OR CALCUTTA. IN OTHER WORDS THEY WOULD DEFINITELY IMPROVE THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIA AREA. THESE PLANS, HOWEVER, INVOLVE USE OF RANGER AS A FERRY BOAT AND PREVENT HER USE AS CARRIER WITH HER OWN PLANES. THE RANGER IS OF COURSE BEST SUITED FOR FERRYING AS WE ARE NOT PROUD OF HER COMPARTMENTATION AND HER STRUCTURAL STRENGTH.

MEASURES NOW IN HAND BY PACIFIC FLEET HAVE NOT BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU IN DETAIL BECAUSE OF SECRECY REQUIREMENTS BUT WE HOPE YOU WILL FIND THEM EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY CAN BE MADE KNOWN TO YOU SHORTLY.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PRESENT LACK OF NAVAL BUTTER TO COVER THE
BREAD BUT I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT BECAUSE OF OPERATIONAL
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICES THERE IS A GRAVE QUESTION AS TO
WHETHER A MAIN FLEET CONCENTRATION SHOULD BE MADE IN CEYLON AREA WITH
MIXED FORCES.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date OCT 1 2 1971

PARTLY BECAUSE OF THIS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF MY FEELING THAT FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDING ANYWHERE IN INDIA OR CEYLON THAT WE ARE INCLINED TO GIVE GREATER CONSIDERATION TO TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF YOUR HOME FLEET UNITS RATHER THAN MIXING UNITS IN INDIAN OCEAN.

IT IS MY PERSONAL THOUGHT THAT YOUR FLEET IN INDIAN OCEAN CAN WELL BE SAFEGUARDED DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS WITHOUT FIGHTING MAJOR ENGAGEMENT. IN THE MEANTIME BUILDING UP LAND BASED PLANE UNITS TO STOP JAPANESE TRANSPORTS. I HOPE YOU WILL LET ME KNOW YOUR THOUGHT IN REGARD TO THE AIR FORCE MEASURES INDICATED ABOVE. WE COULD PUT THEM INTO EFFECT AT ONCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1600, April 16, 1942.

V. 4. Mca JOHN L. McCREA, Captain, U. S. Navy,

Naval Aide to the President.

chivist of the U.S.

Capot, McCroa: The Bresident wants this despatch sent This copy is to go in the President's own file I have copy To be returned to miss

Luca -

No. 134

YOUR SECRET #69. WE HAVE BEEN AND ARE CONTINUING STUDIES OF IMMEDIATE NEEDS. I HOPE YOU WILL READ OUR AIR FORCE SUGGESTIONS SENT TO MARSHALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. THIS WOULD BE MUCH THE QUICKEST WAY OF GETTING PLANES TO INDIA THOUGH THEY WOULD BE LAND BASED PLANES AND FOR THE TIME BEING WOULD COMPEL YOU TO KEEP YOUR FLEET UNDER THEIR COVERAGE. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS PLAN WOULD DO THE MOST TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDING AT CEYLON, MADRAS OR CALCUTTA. IN OTHER WORDS THEY WOULD DEFINITELY IMPROVE THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIA AREA. THESE PLANS, HOWEVER, INVOLVE USE OF RANGER AS A FERRY BOAT AND PREVENT HER USE AS CARRIER WITH HER OWN PLANES.

A).

MEASURES NOW IN HAND BY PACIFIC FLEET HAVE NOT BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU IN DETAIL BECAUSE OF SECRECY REQUIREMENTS BUT WE HOPE YOU WILL FIND THEM EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY CAN BE MADE KNOWN TO YOU SHORTLY.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PRESENT LACK OF NAVAL BUTTER
TO COVER THE BREAD BUT I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT
BECAUSE OF OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICES
THERE IS A GRAVE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A MAIN FLEET CONCENTRATION
SHOULD BE MADE IN CEYLON AREA WITH MIXED FORCES.

PARTLY BECAUSE OF THIS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF MY FEELING
THAT FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT
JAPANESE LANDING ANYWHERE IN INDIA OR CEYLON WE ARE INCLINED

TO GIVE GREATER CONSIDERATION TO TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF YOUR HOME FLEET UNITS RATHER THAN MIXING UNITS IN INDIAN OCEAN.

IT IS MY PERSONAL THOUGHT THAT YOUR FLEET IN INDIAN OCEAN CAN WELL BE SAFEGUARDED DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS WITHOUT FIGHTING MAJOR ENGAGEMENT, IN THE MEANTIME BUILDING UP LAND BASED PLANE UNITS TO STOP JAPANESE TRANSPORTS. I HOPE YOU WILL LET ME KNOW YOUR THOUGHT IN REGARD TO THE AIR FORCE MEASURES INDICATED ABOVE. WE COULD PUT THEM INTO EFFECT AT ONCE.

Rosevel

THE RANGER IS OF COURSE BEST SUITED FOR FERRYING
AS WE ARE NOT PROUD OF HER COMPARTMENTATION AND HER STRUCTURAL
STRENGTH.

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL AND SECRET.

YOUR SECRET NUMBER SIXTYNINE HAS BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AND IT IS NOTED THAT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN MENTION OF AIR FORCE MEASURES SENT TO MARSHALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION NEARLY FORTYEIGHT HOURS AGO PARA YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SAID AIR FORCE MEASURES WILL IMPROVE THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATER PARA MEASURES NOW IN HAND BY PACIFIC FLEET HAVE NOT BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU IN DETAIL BECAUSE OF SECRECY REQUIREMENTS BUT WE EXPECT YOU WILL FIND THEM EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY CAN BE MADE KNOWN PARA YOUR PROPOSALS FOR DISPOSITION OF UNITED STATES SHIPS ARE RECEIVING EVERY CONSIDERATION AND WILL BE REPLIED TO IN DUE COURSE PARA IN ANY EVENT IN ORDER TO AVOID MIXING OF UNITS WHATEVER DECISION MAY BE REACHED WILL PROBABLY BE PREMISED ON TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF HOME FLEET UNITS RATHER THAN MIXING UNITS IN INDIAN OCEAN PARA LET ME URGE YOU TO ACCEPT AIR FORCE MEASURES INDICATED SO THAT THEY MAY BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT ONCE.

Victorious

Mit sent This I was high by mere substitute by mere



April 16, 1942.

PRICRITY

FROM:

OPNAV

TO:

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 135

REFERENCE HOPKINS DESPATCH OF 14 APRIL CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF AGENCIES CONCERNED HAVE REACHED DECISION TO LAY UP TANKERS OPERATING ON
ATLANTIC COAST FOR A PERIOD DEPENDING UPON AVAILABILITY OF MORE EFFECTIVE
PROTECTION. OPPORTUNITY WILL BE TAKEN TO ARM SHIPS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

ACTION ON DRY CARGO SHIPS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

SECRETARY KNOX DID NOT MAKE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. IT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1900, April 16, 1942.

V.L. Maar

JOHN L. McCREA, Captain, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FR 14 1972

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATOR



April 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At a conference held this morning in the Office of Secretary Ickes, the attached post cablegram was agreed upon as a consensus of opinion of those present.

The following were present:

Mr. Davies
Mr. Leon Henderson
Administrator, War Shipping
Administration and three
of his representatives
Mr. Joseph B. Eastman
General Pyron, U.S.A.
Six or eight representatives
of the oil industry

At the conclusion of the meeting I went to see Admiral King where the enclosed draft was prepared in the form submitted herewith for your signature.

Jerry Land

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/495-1 3/28/72
By RACK Dato APR 4 1972

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF UNITED STATES FLEET MEMORANDUM Date. From: Chief of Staff. PROPOSED DRAFT OF DESPATCH IN REPLY TO SECRET CABLE-GRAM NUMBER 51 OF APRIL 14 SIGNED PRIME. No. 135. CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF AGENCIES CONCERNED HAVE REACHED DECISION TO LAY UP TANKERS OPERATING ON ATLANTIC COAST FOR A PERIOD BEPENDING UPON AVAIL-ABILITY OF MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION X OPPORTUNITY WILL BE TAKEN TO ARM SHIPS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE PARA ACTION ON DRY CARGO SHIPS UNDER CONSIDERATION PARA SECRETARY KNOX DID NOT MAKE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM X IT HAS BEEN RETRACTED

Myst

RUSSELL MIXISON.

wowth

FROM: TO: OPNAV

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

April 17, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

No. 136.

PRIORITY

MACKENZIE KING HAS BEEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR TWO
DAYS AND HE WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOMETHING TO SHOW FOR HIS
WASHINGTON VISIT AND PROPOSED A CONFERENCE IN OTTAWA EARLY IN
MAY TO DISCUSS THE GREATLY EXPANDED AIR TRAINING PROGRAM AND
THE RENEWAL OF YOUR EMPIRE AIR TRAINING PLAN ON AN OVERALL
BASIS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. I SEE NO HARM, AND A GOOD DEAL
OF PROBABLE GOOD IN SUCH A CONFERENCE.

I TALKED WITH YOUR EMBASSY ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE RELEASE
TO SYNCHRONIZE WITH KING'S DEPARTURE AND THEY SAW NO REASON
TO BOTHER YOU WITH IT BEFOREHAND.

I HOPE YOU WILL LET SOMEONE COME FROM ENGLAND FOR IT. IN ADDITION TO YOUR TOP PEOPLE OVER HERE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1705, April 17, 1942.

V. 4. h. ac

JOHN L. McCHEA, Captain, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.



By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By U.S. Stewart

Date OCT 1 2 1971

April 17, 1942.

FROM:

OPMAV

TO:

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

PRIORITY

TO: HOPKINS - LONDON



REPORTED THIS MORNING PETAIN RESIGNED. DARLAN IN HIS PLACE BUT LAVAL PROBABLY IN CONTROL. IN VIEW OF THIS WELLES AND I FEEL NORTH AFRICA STAND SOME CHANCE FAILING TO ACCEPT LAVAL'S ORDERS.

THEREFORE HOPE YOU AND MARSHALL WILL TALK THIS NEW SITUATION OVER WITH FORMER NAVAL PERSON WHO DOUBTLESS HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. I AM NOT PROPOSING REVIVAL OF GYMNAST BUT ONLY ASK THAT YOU DISCUSS WHOLE SUBJECT.

THERE IS SOME REASON HERE TO BELIEVE ORANGE
BATTLESHIPS WITHDRAWING TO EASTWARD OUT OF BAY OF BENGAL.
RANGER BEING LOADED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 10:45, April 17, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,

Captain, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.



DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

April 18, 1942.

FROM: TO: OPNAV

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON.

PRIORITY

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

I DO NOT THINK RETURN LONDON ADVISABLE AS MATTER MAY NOT DEVELOP FOR DAYS AND MAYBE WEEKS.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 0915, April 18, 1942.

J. L. he am

JOHN L. McCREA, Captain, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President.

BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Py I. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. Lewest
Date OCK 2 1971





April 21, 1942.

FROM:

OPNAV

TO :

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON, NO. 137

IN REPLY TO YOUR NUMBERS 71 and 72 ALL PLANS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR MOVEMENT OF AGREED UPON AIRPLANES TO INDIA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. BAD WEATHER HELD UP ASSEMBLY OF PURSUIT AIRPLANES FOR SHIPMENT ON RANGER BUT THIS MOVEMENT IS COMPLETED AND RANGER SHOULD LEAVE ON TUESDAY APRIL TWENTYFIRST. YOUR APPROVAL OF THE UTILIZATION OF LIBERATORS PAREN B DASH TWENTYFOUR PAREN MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO INSTALL ASV EQUIPMENT ON THESE AIRPLANES PRIOR TO MOVEMENT TO INDIA. THIS WILL PROVE A GREAT HELP IN RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER THE BAY OF BENGAL OR THE INDIAN OCEAN. SEVEN FLYING FORTRESSES SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES WITHIN FORTYEIGHT HOURS. TWENTYFOUR ADDITIONAL LIBERATORS PAREN B DASH TWENTYFOUR PAREN SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES SHORTLY AFTER MAY TENTH. THIS DELAY ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SATISFACTORY NOSE ARMAMENT PERIOD THE TWENTYONE B DASH TWENTYFIVES WHICH WE TOOK OVER FROM YOU SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES DURING THE COMING WEEK PERIOD THIS DELAY CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NOT ON YOUR AIRPLANES SUCH AS AUTOMATIC PILOTS BEING INSTALLED PRIOR TO THIS MOVEMENT PARAGRAPH AIRCRAFT CARRIER RANGER WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER FERRYING ADDITIONAL AIRPLANES TO INDIA VIA AFRICA ON ITS RETURN FROM WEST AFRICA.